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tory section outlines the structure of the study so
that the reader can see how the various parts fit
together. The reader interested only in a summary
of the analysis and empirical findings should
read this introductory section and then turn
directly to the summary in Section V. This sum-
mary concentrates on the theoretical analysis
while only briefly stating the most important
empirical findings. It omits completely the tech-
nical details of both the theoretical and empirical
work. The reader interested in the technical details
should, of course, turn to the appropriate parts
of Sections I through IV. Insofar as possible these
sections have been written so that the reader can
understand any one section without having to
wade through all of the other sections.
Section I contains the theoretical argument
comparing interest rates and the money stock as
policy-control variables under conditions of uncer-
tainty. The analysis is verbal and graphical, using
the simple Hicksian IS-LM model with random
terms added. This model is general enough to
include both Keynesian and monetarist outlooks,
depending on the specific assumptions as to the
shapes of the functions. Since the theoretical
analysis emphasizes the importance of the relative
INTRODUCTION
T
his study has been motivated by the
recognition that the key to understanding
policy problems is the analysis of uncer-
tainty. Indeed, in the absence of uncertainty it
might be said that there can be no policy prob-
lems, only administrative problems. It is sur-
prising, therefore, that there has been so little
systematic attention paid to uncertainty in the
policy literature in spite of the fact that policy-
makers have repeatedly emphasized the impor-
tance of the unknown.
In the past, the formal models used in the
analysis of monetary policy problems have almost
invariably assumed complete knowledge of the
economic relationships in the model. Uncertainty
is introduced into the analysis, if at all, only
through informal consideration of how much
difference it makes if the true relationships differ
from those assumed by the policymakers. In this
study, on the other hand, uncertainty plays a key
role in the formal model.
Since this study is so long, a few comments
at the outset may assist the reader in finding his
way through it. The remainder of this introduc-
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functions, an examination of the evidence on
relative stability appears in Section II.
Given the conclusion of Section II on the
superiority of a policy operating through adjust-
ments in the money stock, the next question is how
the money stock should be adjusted to achieve
the best results. While policymakers generally
look askance at suggestions for policy rules, the
only way that economists can give long-run advice
is in terms of rules. That is to say, the economist
is not being helpful at all if he in effect says, “Look
at the rate of inflation, at the rate of unemploy-
ment, at the forecasts of the government budget
deficit, and at other relevant factors, and then act
appropriately.” Advice requires the specification
of exactly how policy should be adjusted, and for
this advice to be more than an ad hoc recommen-
dation for the current situation, it must involve
specification of how the money stock or some
other control variable should be adjusted under
hypothetical future conditions of inflation, unem-
ployment, and so forth. The purpose of Section III
is to develop such a rule-of-thumb, or policy
guideline, based on the theoretical and empirical
analyses of Sections I and ll.
A number of technical problems of monetary
control are examined in Section IV. After a short
introduction to the issues, the first part of this
section discusses the relative merits of a number
of monetary aggregates including various reserve
measures, the narrowly and broadly defined
money stocks, and bank credit. The second part
examines whether policy should specify desired
rates of change of an aggregate in terms of weekly,
monthly, or quarterly averages, or in some other
manner. The third part examines in a very incom-
plete fashion a few of the problems of adjusting
open market operations so as to reach the desired
level of an aggregate.
Finally, Section V consists of a summary of
Sections I through IV. To avoid undue repetition,
woven into this summary section are a number of
general observations not examined in the other
sections.
I. THE THEORY OF MONETARY
POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Basic Concepts
The theory of optimal policy under uncer-
tainty has provided many insights into actual
policy problems (Theil, 1964; Brainard, 1967; Holt,
1962; Poole, 1970). While much of this theory is
not accessible to the nonmathematical economist,
it is possible to explain the basic ideas without
resort to mathematics.
The obvious starting point is the observation
that with our incomplete understanding of the
economy and our inability to predict accurately
the occurrence of disturbing factors such as strikes,
wars, and foreign exchange crises, we cannot
expect to hit policy goals exactly. Some periods
of inflation or unemployment are unavoidable.
The inevitable lack of precision in reaching policy
goals is sometimes recognized by saying that the
goals are “reasonably” stable prices and “reason-
ably” full employment.
While the observation above is trite, its
implications are not. Two points are especially
important. First, policy should aim at minimizing
the average size of errors. Second, policy can be
judged only by the average size of errors over a
period of time and not by individual episodes.
Because this second point is particularly subject to
misunderstanding, it needs further amplification.
Since policymakers operate in a world that
is inherently uncertain, they must be judged by
criteria appropriate to such a world. Consider the
analogy of betting on the draw of a ball from an
urn with nine black balls and one red ball. Anyone
offered a $2 payoff for a $1 bet would surely bet
on a black ball being drawn. If the draw produced
the red ball, no one would accuse the bettor of a
stupid bet. Similarly, the policymaker must play
the economic odds. The policymaker should not
be accused of failure if an inflation occurs as the
result of an improbable and unforeseeable event.
Now consider the reverse situation from that
considered in the previous paragraph. Suppose
the bettor with the same odds as above bets on the
red ball and wins. Some would claim that the bet
was brilliant, but assuming that the draw was not
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must be judged foolish. It is foolish because, on
the average, such a betting strategy will lead to
substantially worse results than the opposite
strategy. Betting on red will prove brilliant only
one time out of 10, on the average. Similarly, a
particular policy action may be a bad bet even
though it works in a particular episode.
There is a well-known tendency for gamblers
to try systems that according to the laws of prob-
ability cannot be successful over any length of
time. Frequently, a gambler will adopt a foolish
system as the result of an initial chance success
such as betting on red in the above example. The
same danger exists in economic policy. In fact, the
danger is more acute because there appears to be
a greater chance to “beat the system” by applying
economic knowledge and intuition. There can be
no doubt that it will become increasingly possible
to improve on simple, naive policies through
sophisticated analysis and forecasting and so in
a sense “beat the system.” But even with improved
knowledge some uncertainty will always exist,
and therefore so will the tendency to attempt to
perform better than the state of knowledge really
permits.
Whatever the state of knowledge, there must
be a clear understanding of how to cope with
uncertainty, even though the degree of uncertainty
may have been drastically reduced through the
use of modern methods of analysis. The principal
purpose of this section is to improve understand-
ing of the importance of uncertainty for policy by
examining a simple model in which the policy
problem is treated as one of minimizing errors
on the average. Particular emphasis is placed on
whether controlling policy by adjusting the inter-
est rate or by adjusting the money stock will lead
to smaller errors on the average. The basic argu-
ment is designed to show that the answer to which
policy variable—the interest rate or the money
stock—minimizes average errors depends on the
relative stability of the expenditures and money
demand functions and not on the values of param-
eters that determine whether monetary policy is
in some sense more or less “powerful” than fiscal
policy.
Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty in
a Keynesian Model1
The basic issues concerning the importance
of uncertainty for monetary policy may be exam-
ined within the Hicksian IS-LM version of the
Keynesian system. This elementary model has
two sectors, an expenditure sector and a monetary
sector, and it assumes that the price level is fixed
in the short run.2 Consumption, investment, and
government expenditures functions are combined
to produce the IS function in Figure 1, while the
demand and supply of money functions are com-
bined to produce the LM function. If monetary
policy fixes the stock of money, then the resulting
LM function is LM1, while if policy fixes the inter-
est rate at r0 the resulting LM function is LM2. It
is assumed that incomes above “full employment
income” are undesirable due to inflationary pres-
sures while incomes below full employment
income are undesirable due to unemployment.
If the positions of all the functions could be
predicted with no errors, then to reach full
employment income, Yf, it would make no differ-
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SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 139.
1 For the most part this section represents a verbal and graphical
version of the mathematical argument in Poole (1970).
2 Simple presentations of this model may be found in Reynolds
(1969, pp. 275-82) and Samuelson (1967, pp. 327-32).ence whether policy fixed the money stock or the
interest rate. All that is necessary in either case
is to set the money stock or the interest rate so
that the resulting LM function will cut the IS func-
tion at the full employment level of income.
Significance of Disturbances. The positions
of the functions are, unfortunately, never pre-
cisely known. Consider first uncertainty over the
position of the IS function—which, of course,
results from instability in the underlying con-
sumption and investment functions—while
retaining the unrealistic assumption that the
position of the LM function is known. What is
known about the IS function is that it will lie
between the extremes of IS1 and IS2 in Figure 2.
If the money stock is set at some fixed level, then
it is known that the LM function will be LM1, and
accordingly income will be somewhere between
the extremes of Y1 and Y2. On the other hand,
suppose policymakers follow an interest rate
policy and set the interest rate at r0. In this case
income will be somewhere between Y1′ and Y2′,
a wider range than Y1 to Y2, and so the money
stock policy is superior to the interest rate policy.3
The money stock policy is superior because an
unpredictable disturbance in the IS function will
affect the interest rate, which in turn will produce
spending changes that partly onset the initial
disturbance.
The opposite polar case is illustrated in
Figure 3. Here it is assumed that the position of
the IS function is known with certainty, while
unpredictable shifts in the demand for money
cause unpredictable shifts in the LM function if
a money stock policy is followed. With a money
stock policy, income may end up anywhere
between Y1 and Y2. But an interest rate policy
can fix the LM function at LM3 so that it cuts the
IS function at the full employment level of income,
Yf. With an interest rate policy, unpredictable
shifts in the demand for money are not permitted
to affect the interest rate; instead, in the process
of fixing the interest rate the policymakers adjust
the stock of money in response to the unpredict-
able shifts in the demand for money.
In practice, of course, it is necessary to cope
with uncertainty in both the expenditure and
monetary sectors. This situation is depicted in
the outcomes from an interest rate policy will be represented by
primed Y’s.
Poole
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Figure 2
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 141.
Figure 3
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 140.
3 In Figure 2 and the following diagrams, the outcomes from a
money stock policy will be represented by unprimed Y’s, whileFigure 4, where the unpredictable disturbances are
larger in the expenditure sector, and in Figure 5
where the unpredictable disturbances are larger
in the monetary sector.
The situation is even more complicated than
shown in Figures 4 and 5 by virtue of the fact
that the disturbances in the two sectors may not
be independent. To illustrate this case, consider
Figure 5 in which the interest rate policy is supe-
rior to the money stock policy if the disturbances
are independent. Suppose that the disturbances
were connected in such a way that disturbances
on the LM1 side of the average LM function were
always accompanied by disturbances on the IS2
side of the average IS function. This would mean
that income would never go as low as Y1, but
rather only as low as the intersection of LM1 and
IS2, an income not as low as Y1′ under the interest
rate policy. Similarly, the highest income would
be given by the intersection of LM2 and IS1, an
income not so high as Y2′.4
Importance of Interest Elasticities and Other
Parameters. So far the argument has concentrated
entirely on the importance of the relative sizes
of expenditure and monetary disturbances. But
is it also important to consider the slopes of the
functions as determined by the interest elastici-
ties of investment and of the demand for money,
and by other parameters? Consider the pair of IS
functions, IS1 and IS2, as opposed to the pair, IS3
and IS4, in Figure 6. Each pair represents the
maximum and minimum positions of the IS func-
tion as a result of disturbances, but the pairs have
different slopes. Each pair assumes the same
maximum and minimum disturbances, as shown
by the fact that the horizontal distance between
IS1 and IS2 is the same as between IS3 and IS4.
For convenience, but without loss of generality,
the functions have been drawn so that under
an interest rate policy represented by LM2 both
pairs of IS functions produce the same range of
incomes. To keep the diagram from becoming
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4 The diagram could obviously have been drawn so that an interest
rate policy would be superior to a money stock policy even though
there was an inverse relationship between the shifts in the IS and
LM functions. However, inverse shifts always reduce the margin
Figure 4
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 141.
Figure 5
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 141.
of superiority of an interest rate policy, possibly to the point of
making a money stock policy superior. Conversely, positively
related shifts favor an interest rate policy.Poole
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Figure 7
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 141.
Figure 6
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 141.
Figure 8
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 143.
Figure 9
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 143.too messy, only one LM function, LM1, under a
money stock policy has been drawn. Now con-
sider disturbances that would shift LM1 back and
forth. From Figure 6 it is easy to see that if shifts
in LM1 would lead to income fluctuations greater
than from Y1′ to Y2′—which fluctuations would
occur under an interest rate policy—then an
interest policy would be preferred regardless of
whether we have the pair IS1 and IS2, or the pair
IS3 and IS4.
The importance of the slope of the LM function
is investigated in Figure 7 for the two LM pairs,
LM1 and LM2, and LM3 and LM4. The functions
have been drawn so that each pair represents
different slopes but an identical range of distur-
bances. It is clear that if shifts in IS1 are small
enough, then an interest rate policy will be pre-
ferred regardless of which pair of LM functions
prevails. Conversely, if a money stock policy is
preferred under one pair of LM functions because
of the shifts in the IS function, then a money stock
policy will also be preferred under the other pair
of LM functions.
The upshot of this analysis is that the crucial
issue for deciding upon whether an interest rate
or a money stock policy should be followed is the
relative size of the disturbances in the expendi-
ture and monetary sectors. Contrary to much
recent discussion, the issue is not whether the
interest elasticity of the demand for money is
relatively low or whether fiscal policy is more or
less “powerful” than monetary policy.
To avoid possible confusion, it should be
emphasized that the above conclusion is in terms
of the choice between a money stock policy and
an interest rate policy. However, if a money stock
policy is superior, then the steeper the LM func-
tion is, the lower the range of income fluctuation,
as can be seen from Figure 7. It is also clear from
Figure 6 that under an interest rate policy an error
in setting the interest rate will lead to a larger error
in hitting the income target if the IS function is
relatively flat than if it is relatively steep. But
these facts do not affect the choice between
interest rate and money stock policies.
The “Combination” Monetary Policy. Up to
this point the analysis has concentrated on the
choice of either the interest rate or the money
stock as the policy variable. But it is also possible
to consider a “combination” policy that works
through the money stock and the interest rate
simultaneously. An understanding of the combi-
nation policy may be obtained by further consid-
eration of the cases depicted in Figures 2 and 7.
In Figure 8 the disturbances, as in Figure 2,
are entirely in the expenditure sector. As was
seen in Figure 2, the result obtained by fixing the
money stock so that LM1 prevailed was superior
to that obtained by fixing the interest rate so that
LM2 prevailed. But now suppose that instead of
fixing the money stock, the money stock were
reduced every time the interest rate went up and
increased every time the interest rate went down.
This procedure would, of course, increase the
amplitude of interest rate fluctuations.5 But if the
proper relationship between the money stock and
the interest rate could be discovered, then the
LM function could be made to look like LM0 in
Figure 8. The result would be that income would
be pegged at Yf. Disturbances in the IS function
would produce changes in the interest rate, which
in turn would produce spending changes suffi-
cient to completely offset the effect on income of
the initial disturbance.
The most complicated case of all to explain
graphically is that in which it is desirable to
increase the money stock as the interest rate rises
and decrease it as the interest rate falls. In Figure 9
the leftmost position of the LM function as a
result of disturbances is LM1 when the money
stock is fixed and is LM2 when the combination
policy of introducing a positive money-interest
relationship is followed. The rightmost positions
of the LM functions under these conditions are not
shown in the diagram. When the interest rate is
pegged, the LM function is LM3. If either LM1 or
LM2 prevails, the intersection with IS1 produces
the lowest income, which is below the Y1′ level
Poole
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5 The increased fluctuations in interest rates must be carefully
interpreted. In this model the IS function is assumed to fluctuate
around a fixed-average position. However, in more complicated
models involving changes in the average position of the IS function,
perhaps through the operation of the investment accelerator, interest
rate fluctuations may not be increased by the policy being discussed
in the text. By increasing the stability of income over a period of
time, the policy would increase the stability of the IS function in
Figure 8 and thereby reduce interest rate fluctuations.obtained with LM3. But in the case of LM2, income
at Y1 is only a little lower than at Y1′, whereas
when IS2 prevails, LM2 is better than LM3 by the
difference between Y2 and Y2′. Since the gap
between Y2 and Y2′ is larger than that between Y1
and Y1′, it is on the average better to adopt LM2
than LM3 even though the extremes under LM2
are a bit larger than under LM3.
Extensions of Model. At this point a natural
question is that of the extent to which the above
analysis would hold in more complex models.
Until more complicated models are constructed
and analyzed mathematically, there is no way of
being certain. But it is possible to make educated
guesses on the effects of adding more goals and
more policy instruments, and of relaxing the rigid
price assumption.
Additional goals may be added to the model
if they are specified in terms of “closer is better”
rather than in terms of a fixed target that must be
met. For example, it would not be mathematically
difficult to add an interest rate goal to the model
analyzed above, if deviations from a target interest
rate were permitted but were treated as being
increasingly harmful. On the other hand, it is
clear that if there were a fixed-interest target,
then the only possible policy would be to peg
the interest rate, and income stabilization would
not be possible with monetary policy alone.
The addition of fiscal policy instruments
affects the results in two major ways. First, the
existence of income taxes and of government
expenditures inversely related to income (for
example, unemployment benefits) provides auto-
matic stabilization. In terms of the model, auto-
matic stabilizers make the IS function steeper than
it otherwise would be, thus reducing the impact
of monetary disturbances, and reduce the variance
of expenditures disturbances in the reduced-form
equation for income. This effect would be shown
in Figure 6 by drawing IS1 so that it cuts LM2 to
the right of Y1′ and drawing IS2 so that it cuts LM2
to the left of Y2′.
The second major impact of adding fiscal
policy instruments occurs if both income and the
interest rate are goals. Horizontal shifts in the IS
function that are induced by fiscal policy adjust-
ments, when accompanied by a coordinated mone-
tary policy, make it possible to come closer to a
desired interest rate without any sacrifice in
income stability. An obvious illustration is pro-
vided by the case in which the optimal monetary
policy from the point of view of stabilizing income
is to set the interest rate as in Figure 5. Fiscal
policy can then shift the pair of IS functions, IS1
and IS2, to the right or left so that the expected
value of income is at the full employment level.
If the interest rate is not a goal variable, then
fiscal policy actions that shift the IS function
without changing its slope do not improve income
stabilization over what can be accomplished with
monetary policy alone, provided the lags in the
effects of monetary policy are no longer than those
in the effects of fiscal policy. An exception would
be a situation in which reaching full employment
with monetary policy alone would require an
unattainable interest rate, such as a negative one.
These comments on fiscal policy have been
presented in order to clarify the relationship
between fiscal and monetary policy. While mone-
tary policymakers may urge fiscal action, for the
most part monetary policy must take the fiscal
setting as given and adapt monetary policy to
this setting. It must then be recognized that an
interest rate goal can be pursued only at the cost
of sacrificing somewhat the income goal.6
All of the analysis so far has taken place
within a model in which the price level is fixed
in the short run. This assumption may be relaxed
by recognizing that increases in money income
above the full employment level involve a mix-
ture of real income gains and price inflation.
Similarly, reductions in money income below
the full employment level involve real income
reductions and price deflation (or a slower rate
of price inflation). The model used above can be
reinterpreted entirely in terms of money income
so that departures from what was called above
the “full employment” level of income involve a
mixture of real income and price changes. Stabi-
6 An interest rate goal must be sharply distinguished from the use
of the interest rate as a monetary policy instrument. By a goal
variable is meant a variable that enters the policy utility function.
Income and interest rate goals might be simultaneously pursued
by setting the money stock as the policy instrument or by setting
the interest rate as the policy instrument.
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of the two goals of stabilizing real output and of
stabilizing the price level.
However, interpreted in this way the structure
of the model is deficient because it fails to dis-
tinguish between real and nominal interest rates.
Price level increases generate inflationary expec-
tations, which in turn generate an outward shift
in the IS function. The model may be patched up
to some extent by assuming that price changes
make up a constant fraction of the deviation of
income from its full employment level and assum-
ing further that the expected rate of inflation is a
constant multiplied by the actual rate of inflation.
Expenditures are then made to depend on the real
rate of interest, the difference between the nomi-
nal rate of interest and the expected rate of infla-
tion. The result is to make the IS function, when
drawn against the nominal interest rate, flatter and
to increase the variance of disturbances to the IS
function. These elects are more pronounced: (a)
the larger is the interest sensitivity of expendi-
tures; (b) the larger is the fraction of price changes
in money income changes; and (c) the larger is
the effect of price changes on price expectations.
The conclusion is that since price flexibility in
effect increases the variance of disturbances in
the IS function, a money stock policy tends to be
favored over an interest rate policy.
II. EVIDENCE ON THE RELATIVE
MAGNITUDES OF REAL AND
MONETARY DISTURBANCES
Nature of Available Evidence
Little evidence is available that directly tests
the relative stability of the expenditure and money
demand functions. It is necessary, therefore, to
proceed somewhat indirectly. First, simulation of
the FR-MIT model7 is used to show the probable
size of the effect on gross national product (GNP),
the GNP deflator, and the unemployment rate of
an assumed expenditure disturbance. This evi-
dence provides some indication of the extent to
which the impact of an expenditure disturbance
depends on the choice between the money stock
and the Treasury bill rate as monetary policy con-
trol variables. This evidence bears only on the
question of what happens if an expenditure dis-
turbance occurs, not on the relative stability of
the expenditure and money demand functions.
However, this approach is useful when combined
with intuitive feelings about relative stability.
The second type of evidence, derived from
reduced-form studies, is more directly related to
the question of relative stability; nevertheless, it
is not entirely satisfactory because the studies
examined were not designed to answer the ques-
tion at hand. To supplement these studies by
other investigators, there follows a simple test of
the stability of the demand for money function.
Impact of an Expenditure Disturbance
Simulation of the FR-MIT model provides
some insight as to how the size of the impact of
an expenditure disturbance depends on the choice
of the monetary policy instrument. The simula-
tion technique is necessary because the FR-MIT
model is nonlinear, making it impossible to obtain
an explicit expression for the reduced form.8
However, comparison of two sets of simulations
provides some interesting results. Except as indi-
cated below, the simulations all used the actual
historical values of the model’s exogenous vari-
ables and all simulations started with 1962-I, a
starting date selected arbitrarily.
The first set of five simulations assumes an
exogenous money stock that grows by 1 percent
per quarter, starting with the actual money stock
in 1961-IV as the base. To investigate the impact
of a disturbance in an exogenous expenditures
variable, the exogenous variable “federal expen-
ditures on defense goods” was set in one simula-
tion at its actual level minus $10 billion; in another
at actual minus $5 billion; and in three further
simulations at actual, actual plus $5 billion, and
actual plus $10 billion. This procedure produces
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7 For a general description of the model, see de Leeuw and Gramlich
(1968).
8 In a reduced-form equation, an endogenous (that is, simultaneously
determined) variable is expressed as depending only on exogenous
and predetermined variables (variables taken as given for the
current period).four hypothetical observations on “disturbances”
in defense expenditures, of –10, –5, +5, and +10,
and the simulation provides four corresponding
observations for the change in income (and other
endogenous variables). By using income as an
example, the change in an endogenous variable
in response to a disturbance in defense expendi-
tures is the difference between income simulated
by the model when defense expenditures were
set at actual historical values and when set at
actual plus 10, plus 5, and so forth. The income
obtained in the simulations, even when defense
expenditures are set at actual levels, is not the
same as the actual historical level of income both
because the assumed monetary policy differs from
the policy actually followed and because of errors
in the model itself.
By calculating the ratio of the change in an
endogenous variable to the disturbance in defense
expenditures for the four observations, four
estimates of the linear approximation to the
reduced-form parameter, or multiplier, of defense
expenditures are obtained, and these four esti-
mates have been averaged to produce a single
estimate. Since the effects of a disturbance accu-
mulate over time, the reduced-form parameter
estimate has been calculated for the 12 quarters
from 1962-I through 1964-IV. Exactly the same
procedure has been used for the simulations with
a fixed rate for 3-month Treasury bills. Finally, the
ratio of the parameter estimates for the reduced
forms under the money stock and interest rate
policies has been calculated with the parameter
estimates from the simulations with the exoge-
nous money stock in the numerator of the ratio.
The reduced-form parameter estimates under
the two monetary policies, and the ratios of these
estimates, have been plotted in Figure 10 for 12
quarters for the reduced forms for nominal GNP,
for the unemployment rate, and for the GNP
deflator. The results are striking. A substantial
difference appears in the parameters of reduced
forms for the fourth quarter following the initial
disturbance, and the differences in the parameters
become steady thereafter. By the 12th quarter the
reduced-form parameters for the money stock
policy are only about 40 percent of those for the
interest rate policy.
The interpretation of these results is that
employment, output, and the price level are far
more sensitive to disturbances in defense expen-
ditures under an interest rate policy than under
a money stock policy. This conclusion presum-
ably generalizes to expenditures variables other
than defense expenditures, but the results would
differ in detail because each expenditures vari-
able enters the FR-MIT model in a somewhat dif-
ferent way.
It might be argued that these results suggest
that there is no significant difference between
interest rate and money stock policies because
the reduced-form parameters are essentially iden-
tical up to about four quarters. Surely, so this
Poole
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Figure 10
Reduced-Form Parameter Estimates for
Federal Defense Expenditures from FR-MIT
Model
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 146.argument goes, mistakes could be discovered and
onset within four quarters. There are two diffi-
culties with this argument. The first is that the
FR-MIT model may overstate the length of the
lags and therefore understate the differences in
reduced-form parameters for the two policies for
the quarters immediately following a disturbance.
But the second and more important reason is that
it may not be easy to reverse the effects of the
disturbance after the disturbance has been dis-
covered. With an interest rate policy, a very large
change in the rate might be required to offset the
effects appearing after the fourth quarter, and such
a change might not be feasible, or at least not
desirable in terms of its effects on security markets
and on income in the more distant future.
The numerical results reported above depend,
of course, on the FR-MIT model, and this model
is deficient in a number of respects. But any
model in which, other things being equal, invest-
ment and other interest-sensitive expenditures
decline when interest rates rise will show results
in the same direction.
These results may be extended to analyze the
significance of errors in forecasting exogenous
variables. Consider an explicit expression for the
reduced form for income. Let the exogenous vari-
ables such as government expenditures, perhaps
certain categories of investment, strikes, weather,
population growth, and so forth, be X1, X2, …, Xn,
and let the coefficients of these variables be ʱ1, ʱ2,
…, ʱn when the interest rate is the policy instru-
ment, and ʻ1, ʻ2, …, ʻn when the money stock is
the instrument. Then the reduced form for income
when the interest rate is the instrument is
(1)
where ʱr is the coefficient of the interest rate and
u is the random disturbance. On the other hand,
when the money stock is the instrument, the
reduced form is
(2)
As discussed in Section II, the disturbance ʽt
may have either a larger or a smaller variance than
the disturbance ut. One factor tending to make
ʽt smaller than ut is that a money stock policy
YX X X M nn M =+ + + … + + + ʻʻ ʻ ʻ ʻ ʽ 01 12 2
YX XX r u nn r =+ + + … + + + ʱʱ ʱ ʱ ʱ 01 12 2
reduces the impact of expenditures disturbances,
but another factor, the introduction into the
reduced form of money demand disturbances,
tends to make ʽt larger. The net result of these
two factors cannot be determined a priori.
But in formulating policy it is not possible to
reason directly from equations 1 and 2 because
many of the Xi cannot be predicted in advance
with perfect accuracy. For scientific purposes ex
post it may be possible to say that a change in
income was caused by a change in some Xi; for
policy purposes ex ante this scientific knowledge
is useless unless the change in Xi can be predicted.
It is necessary to think of each Xi as being com-
posed of a predictable part, X ˆ
i, and an unpredict-
able part, Ei.
For policy purposes the error term in the
reduced form includes both the disturbances to
the equation and the errors in forecasting exoge-
nous variables. The two types of errors ought to
be treated exactly alike in formulating policy.
Equations 1 and 2 can then be rewritten as follows:
(3)
(4)
For policy purposes the error term in the reduced-
form equation 3 is the sum of the terms from ʱ1E1t
through ut and in the reduced-form equation 4
the sum of the term ʻ1E1t through ʽt.
A systematic study of the importance of the
Ei terms cannot be made because no formal record
of errors in forecasting exogenous variables exists
insofar as the author knows. However, some
insight into the problem may be obtained by list-
ing the variables that must be forecast. Which
variables have to be forecast depends, of course,
on the model being used. The larger econometric
models generally have relatively few exogenous
variables that raise forecasting problems because
so many variables are explained endogeneously
by the model itself. The FR-MIT model has 63
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easy to forecast, but others are subject to consid-
erable forecasting error. The latter include such
variables as exports, number of mandays idle due
to strikes, armed forces, and federal expenditures.
Furthermore, this model involves lagged endoge-
nous variables in many equations; hence an inac-
curate forecast of GNP next quarter will increase
the error in forecasting GNP two quarters into the
future, which in turn will lead to errors in fore-
casting GNP three quarters into the future, and so
forth. Errors in forecasting exogenous variables,
therefore, produce cumulative errors in forecast-
ing GNP in future quarters.
In simpler models the forecasting problem is
more severe. Consider, for example, the opposite
extreme from the large econometric model, the
single-equation model. Convenient representatives
of such models are those spawned in the contro-
versy over the Friedman-Meiselman paper (1963)
on the stability of the money/income relationship.
The various definitions of exogenous, or “autono-
mous,” spending utilized by the various authors
in this controversy are as follows :
a) Friedman-Meiselman definition: Autono-
mous expenditures consist of the “net
private domestic investment plus the gov-
ernment deficit on income and product
account plus the net foreign balance”
(Friedman and Meiselman, 1963, p. 184).
b)Ando-Modigliani definition: Autonomous
expenditures consist of two variables which
enter the reduced form with different coef-
ficients. One variable is “property tax por-
tion of indirect business taxes” plus “net
interest paid by government” plus “govern-
ment transfer payment” minus “unemploy-
ment insurance benefits” plus “subsidies
less current surplus of government enter-
prises” minus “statistical discrepancy”
minus “excess of wage accruals over dis-
bursement.” The second variable is “net
investment in plant and equipment, and
in residential houses” plus “exports” (Ando
and Modigliani, 1965a, pp. 695-96, 702).
c) DePrano-Mayer definition: The basic defini-
tion is “investment in producers’ durable
equipment, nonresidential construction,
residential construction, federal govern-
ment expenditures on income and product
account, and exports. One variant of this
hypothesis subtracts capital consumption
estimates, and the other does not” (DePrano
and Mayer, 1965a, p. 739). DePrano and
Mayer also tested 18 other definitions of
autonomous expenditures (DePrano and
Mayer, 1965a, pp. 739-40).
d)Hester definition: Autonomous expendi-
tures consist of the “sum of government
expenditure, net private domestic invest-
ment, and the trade balance” (Hester, 1964a,
p. 366). Hester also experimented with
three other definitions involving alterna-
tive treatments of imports, capital consump-
tion allowances, and inventory investment
(Hester, 1964a, pp. 366-67).
To a considerable extent the diversity in these
definitions is misleading because except for the
Friedman-Meiselman definition all the definitions
are in fact rather similar. But whichever definition
is used, it is impossible to escape the feeling that
inaccurate forecasting of exogenous variables is
likely to be a major source of uncertainty. And
while this discussion has taken place within the
context of formal models, exactly the same prob-
lem plagues judgmental forecasting. Every fore-
casting method can be viewed as starting from
forecasts of “input,” or exogenous, variables and
then proceeding to judge the implications of these
inputs for GNP and other dependent, or endoge-
nous, variables.
Regardless of what type of model is used, it
appears that for the foreseeable future it will be
necessary to forecast exogenous variables that
simply cannot be forecast accurately by using
present methods. As a result, it seems very likely
that the error term including forecast errors has
a far smaller variance in equation 4 than in equa-
tion 3. Indeed, it might be argued that as a source
of uncertainty the Ei terms are far more important
than the u or ʽ terms, and therefore that the
smaller size of the ʻi parameters as compared to
the ʱi parameters is of great importance. If the
parameter estimates from the FR-MIT model are
accepted, the standard deviation of the total ran-
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errors in forecasting exogenous variables) would
be over twice as large under an interest rate policy
as under a money stock policy. If this argument
is correct, shifting from the current policy of
emphasizing interest rates to one of controlling
the money stock might cut average errors in half,
where errors are measured in terms of the devia-
tions of employment, output, and price level from
target levels for these variables.
Evidence from Reduced-Form Equations
Additional insight into the relative sizes of
disturbances under interest rate and money stock
policies may be obtained by examining the con-
troversy generated by the Friedman-Meiselman
paper on the stability of the money/income rela-
tionship (Friedman and Meiselman, 1963). In this
paper equations almost the same as equations 1
and 2 above were estimated. The equation corre-
sponding to equation 1 differs in that the exoge-
nous variables were assumed to consist only of a
single autonomous spending variable, as defined
above. The equation corresponding to equation 2
has the same disability for our purposes, but it
also did not include an interest rate as a variable.
Before examining the implications of the
Friedman-Meiselman findings for this study, it
should be noted that their approach was sharply
criticized in papers by Donald D. Hester (1964a),
Albert Ando and Franco Modigliani (1965a), and
Michael DePrano and Thomas Mayer (1965a).
These critics particularly attacked the Friedman-
Meiselman definition of autonomous expendi-
tures, and proposed and tested the alternative
definitions listed above. However, they also
attacked the single-equation approach and recom-
mended the use of large models instead.
The tests of alternative equations must be
regarded as inconclusive in terms of which vari-
able—the money stock or autonomous spending—
is more closely related to the level of income.9
Both approaches achieve values for R
2 of 0.98 or
0.99 so that the unexplained variance is very small
in both cases. It seems very unlikely that the addi-
tion of an interest rate variable to the equations
by using autonomous expenditures as the explana-
tory variable, which addition would make the
equations correspond to equation 1 above, would
make any substantial difference.
From this evidence it appears that ex post
explanations of the level of income are about as
accurate by using autonomous expenditures alone
as are those by using money stock alone. But given
the inaccuracies in forecasting autonomous expen-
ditures, it must be concluded that ex ante expla-
nations by using the money stock are substantially
more accurate than those with forecasts of autono-
mous expenditures. From this evidence, the total
random term in equation 4 appears to have a
substantially smaller variance than the total ran-
dom term in equation 3.
For the reasons mentioned by the Friedman-
Meiselman critics, evidence from single-equation
studies cannot be considered definitive. But nei-
ther can the evidence be ignored, especially in
light of the difficulties encountered in the con-
struction and the use of large econometric models
such as the FR-MIT model.
Evidence on Stability of Demand for
Money Function
One of the shortcomings of the single-equation
studies discussed above is that their authors paid
too little attention to the stability of regression
coefficients over time. Consider the following
statement by Friedman and Meiselman:
The income velocity of circulation of money
is consistently and decidedly stabler than the
investment multiplier except only during the
early years of the Great Depression after 1929.
There is throughout, including those years, a
close and consistent relation between the stock
of money and consumption or income, and
between year-to-year changes in the stock of
money and in consumption or income
(Friedman and Meiselman, 1963, p. 186).
This conclusion is based on correlation coef-
ficients between money and income (or consump-
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9 For reasons that need not be explained here, most of this contro-
versy was conducted in terms of equations with consumption
rather than GNP as the dependent variable. In the Friedman-
Meiselman study, however, results are reported for equations with
GNP (Friedman and Meiselman, 1963, p. 227). Such results are
also reported in Andersen and Jordan (1968, p. 17).tion), but what is relevant for policy is the
regression coefficient, which determines how
much income will change for a given change in
the money stock. In the Friedman-Meiselman
study, a table (Friedman and Meiselman, 1963,
p. 227) reports the regression coefficient for
income on money as being 1.469 for annual data
1897-1958. However, the same table reports regres-
sion coefficients for 12 subperiods, some of which
are overlapping, ranging from 1.092 to 2.399.
With a few exceptions, most economists
agree that velocity changes can be explained in
part by interest rate changes.10 Thus, variability
in the regression coefficients when income is
regressed on money is not evidence of the insta-
bility of the demand for money function. To obtain
some evidence on the stability of this function,
the following simple procedure was used. Quar-
terly data were collected on the money stock, GNP,
and Aaa corporate bond yields for 1947 through
1968. A demand for money function was fitted
by regressing the log of the interest rate on the
log of velocity, and vice versa. The regressions
were run for the four periods, 1947 through 1960,
1947 through 1962, 1947 through 1964, and 1947
through 1966. The results inside each estimation
period were then compared with the results out-
side the estimation period.
The results of this process for the 1947-60
estimation period are shown in Figure 11. The
observations for 1947 through 1960 are repre-
sented by dots, and the observations for 1961
through 1968 by X’s. The two least-squares regres-
sions—log interest rate on log velocity and vice
versa—fitted for the 1947-60 period have been
drawn. From Figure 11 it appears that the rela-
tionship since 1960 has been quite similar to the
one prior to 1960.
Table 1 presents the results of applying a
standard statistical test to the regression and
postregression periods to determine whether the
demand for money function was stable. To under-
stand this table, refer first to section A of the table,
and to the 1947-60 estimation period. Section A
reports results from regressing the log of velocity
on the log of the Aaa corporate bond rate, and the
first row refers to the regression for 1947 through
1960. The square of the regression’s standard error
of estimate is 0.00517 with 54 degrees of freedom.
There were 32 quarters in the postregression
period 1961 through 1968, and for this period the
mean-square error of velocity from the velocity
predicted by the regression is 0.00836. The ratio
of the mean-square errors from regression outside
to those inside the estimation period is given in
the column labeled “F.” Since the ratio of two
mean squares has the F distribution under the
hypothesis that both mean squares were produced
by the same process, an F test may be used to test
whether the demand for money function has been
stable. If the function has been stable, then errors
from regression outside the period of estimation
10 For a convenient review of evidence on this subject, see Laidler
(1969).
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Figure 11
Velocity and Interest Rate Regressions
(regressions fitted to quarterly data, 1947-60)
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 150.should be, on the average, the same size as the
errors inside the period of estimation. For the
1947-60 regression being discussed, F = 1.62 and
is significant at the 10 percent level but not at
the 5 percent level.
Looking at Table 1 as a whole it can be seen
that, for three of the regressions, the errors outside
the period of estimation are not statistically sig-
nificantly larger than those inside the period of
estimation. Indeed, for the bond rate regression
for the 1947-60 period, the errors outside the
period of estimation were actually smaller, on
the average, than those inside the period of esti-
mation. Overall, however, these results taken at
face value cast some doubt on the stability of the
demand for money function.
However, there is reason to believe that there
are problems in applying the F test in this situa-
tion. The reason is that the residuals from regres-
sion exhibit a very high positive serial correlation
as indicated by Durbin-Watson test statistics of
around 0.15 for all of the regressions. What this
means is that the effective number of degrees of
freedom is actually less than indicated in the table,
and with fewer degrees of freedom the F ratios
computed have less statistical significance than
the significance levels reported in the table. The
only way around this problem is to run a more
complex regression that removes the serial cor-
relation of the residuals, but there is no general
agreement among economists as to exactly what
variables belong in such a regression. The virtue
of the simple regressions of velocity on an inter-
est rate and vice versa is that this form has been
used successfully by many investigators starting
in 1954 (Latané, 1954).
The appropriate conclusion to be drawn from
this evidence would seem to be that the relation-
ship between velocity and the Aaa corporate bond
rate is too close and too stable to be ignored, but
not close enough and stable enough to eliminate
all doubts. However, the question is not whether
an ironclad case for a money stock policy exists
but rather whether the evidence taken as a whole
argues for the adoption of such a policy. While
there is certainly room for differing interpreta-
tions of Figure 11 and Table 1, and of the other
evidence examined above, on the whole all of
these results seem to point in the same direction.
It appears that the money stock rather than inter-
est rates should be used as the monetary policy
control variable.
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Table 1
Tests of the Stability of the Demand for Money Function by Using Quarterly Data
Regression Progression
Estimation period (SEE)2 d.f. MSE d.f. F Significance level
A. Log velocity regressed on log Aaa corporate bond yield
1947-60 .00517 54 .00836 32 1.62 .10
1947-62 .00484 62 .00746 24 1.54 .10
1947-64 .00509 70 .00587 16 1.15 >.25
1947-66 .00502 78 .00986 8 1.96 .10
B. Log Aaa corporate bond yield regressed on log velocity
1947-60 .00684 54 .00589 32 1.16* >.25
1947-62 .00614 62 .00723 24 1.18 >.25
1947-64 .00570 70 .01162 16 2.04 .025
1947-66 .00537 78 .02192 8 4.08 .005
NOTE: *MSE < (SEE)2.III. A MONETARY RULE FOR
GUIDING POLICY
Rationale for a Rule-of-Thumb
The purpose of this section is to develop a
rule-of-thumb to guide policy. Such a rule—not
meant to be followed slavishly—would incorpo-
rate advice in as systematic a way as possible. The
rule proposed here is based upon the theory and
evidence in Sections II and III and upon a close
examination of post-accord experience.
Individual policymakers inevitably use
informal rules-of-thumb in making decisions.
Like everyone else, policymakers develop cer-
tain standard ways of reacting to standard situa-
tions. These standard reactions are not, of course,
unchanging over time, but are adjusted and devel-
oped according to experience and new theoreti-
cal ideas. If there were no standard reactions to
standard situations, behavior would have to be
regarded as completely random and unpredict-
able. The word “capricious” is often, and not
unfairly, used to describe such unpredictable
behavior.
There are several difficulties with relying on
unspecified rules-of-thumb. For one thing, the
rules may simply be wrong. But an even more
important factor, because formally specified rules
may also be wrong, is that the use of unspecified
rules allows little opportunity for cumulative
improvements over time. A policymaker may have
an extremely good operating rule in his head and
excellent intuition as to the application of the
rule but unless this rule can be written down
there is little chance that it can be passed on to
subsequent generations of policymakers.
An explicit operating rule provides a way of
incorporating the lessons of the past into current
policy. For example, it is generally felt that mone-
tary policy was too expansive following the impo-
sition of the tax surcharge in 1968. Unless the
lesson of this experience is incorporated into an
operating rule, it may not be remembered in 1975
or 1980. How many people now remember the
overly tight policy in late 1959 and early 1960
that was a result of miscalculating the effects of
the long steel strike in 1959? Since the FOMC
membership changes over time, many of the cur-
rent members will not have learned firsthand the
lesson from a policy mistake or a policy success
10 years ago. If the FOMC member is not an econ-
omist, he may not even be aware of the 10-year-
old lesson.
It is for these reasons that an attempt is made
in this section to develop a practical policy rule
that incorporates the lessons from past experience.
The rule is not offered as one to be followed to
the last decimal place or as one that is good for
all time. Rather, it is offered as a guide—or as a
benchmark—against which current policy may
be judged.
A rule may take the form of a formal model
that specifies what actions should be taken to
achieve the goals decided upon by the policy-
makers. Such a model would provide forecasts
of goal variables, such as GNP, conditional on
the policy actions taken. The structure of the
model and the estimates of its parameters would,
of course, be derived from past data and in that
sense the model would incorporate the lessons
of the past.
But in spite of advances in modelbuilding
and forecasting, it is clear that forecasts are still
quite inaccurate on the average. In a study of the
accuracy of forecasts by several hundred fore-
casters between 1953 and 1963, Zarnowitz con-
cluded that the mean absolute forecast error was
about 40 percent of the average year-to-year
change in GNP (Zarnowitz, 1967, p. 4). He also
reported, “there is no evidence that forecasters’
performance improved steadily over the period
covered by the data” (Zarnowitz, 1967, p. 5).
Not only are forecasts several quarters ahead
inaccurate but also there is considerable uncer-
tainty at, and after, the occurrence of business-
cycle turning points as to whether a turning point
has actually occurred. In a study of FOMC recog-
nition of turning points for the period 1947-60,
Hinshaw concluded that (Fels and Hinshaw, 1968,
p. 122):
The beginning data of the Committee’s recog-
nition pattern varied from one to nine months
before the cyclical turn…On the other hand,
the ending of the recognition pattern varied
from one to seven months after the turn…With
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was certain of a turning point within six
months after the NBER date of the turn. At the
date of the turn, the estimated probability was
generally below 50; it reached the vicinity of
50 about two months after the turn.
This recognition record, which is as good as that
in 10 widely circulated publications whose
forecasts were also studied in (Friedman and
Meiselman, 1963) casts further doubt on the value
of placing great reliance on the forecasts.11
Given the accuracy of forecasts at the current
state of knowledge,12 it seems likely that for some
time to come forecasts will be used primarily to
supplement a policy-decisionmaking process that
consists largely of reactions to current develop-
ments. Only gradually will policymakers place
greater reliance on formal forecasting models.13
While a considerable amount of work is being
done on such models, essentially no attention is
being paid to careful specification of how policy
should react to current developments. While
sophisticated models will no doubt in time be
developed into highly useful policy tools, it
appears that in the meantime relatively simple
approaches may yield substantial improvements
in policy. Given that knowledge accumulates
rather slowly, it can be expected that carefully
specified but simple methods will be successful
before large-scale models will lie. Careful speci-
fication of policy responses to current develop-
ments is but a small step beyond intuitive policy
responses to current developments. This step
surely represents a logical evolution of the policy-
formation process.
Post-Accord Monetary Policy
That an operating guideline is needed can be
seen from the experience since the Treasury–
Federal Reserve accord. In order that this experi-
ence may be understood better, subperiods were
defined in terms of “stable,” “easing,” or “firming”
policy as determined from the minutes of the
Federal Open Market Committee. The minutes
used are those published in the Annual Reports
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System for 1950 to 1968. The definitions of “sta-
ble,” “easing,” and “firming” periods are neces-
sarily subjective as are the determinations of
dates when policy changed.14 The dating of pol-
icy changes was based primarily on the FOMC
minutes, although the dates of changes in the
discount rate and in reserve requirements were
used to supplement the minutes. “Stable” periods
are those in which the policy directive was
unchanged except for relatively minor wording
changes. In some cases the directive was essen-
tially unchanged although the minutes reflected
the belief that policy might have to be changed in
the near future. While the Manager of the System
Open Market Account might change policy
somewhat as a result of such discussions, the
unchanged directive was taken at face value in
defining policy turning points.
More difficult problems of interpretation
were raised by such directives as “unchanged
policy, but err on the side of ease,” or “resolve
doubts on the side of ease.” Such statements were
used to help in defining several periods during
which policy was progressively eased (or tight-
ened). For example, in one meeting the directive
might call for easier policy, the next meeting might
call for unchanged policy but with doubts to be
resolved on the side of ease, and a third meeting
might call for further ease. These three meetings
would then be taken together as defining an
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11 For further analysis of forecasting accuracy, see Mincer (1969).
12 The accuracy of forecasts may now be better than in the periods
examined in the studies cited above. But without a number of years
of data there would be no way of knowing whether forecasts have
improved, and so forecasts must in any case be assumed to be
subject to a wide margin of error at the present time.
13 It may be objected that great reliance is already placed on forecasts,
at least on judgmental forecasts. However, these forecasts typically
involve a large element of extrapolation of current developments.
It seems fair to say that in most cases in which conditions forecast
a number of quarters ahead differ markedly from current conditions,
policy has followed the dictates of current conditions rather than
of the forecasts.
14 The author was greatly assisted in these judgments by Joan Walton
of the Special Studies Section of the Board’s Division of Research
and Statistics. Miss Walton, who is not an economist, carefully read
the minutes of the entire period and in a large table recorded the
principal items that seemed important at each FOMC meeting.
Having a noneconomist read the minutes tempered the inevitable
tendency for an economist to read either too much or too little
into the minutes. However, the final interpretation of the minutes
rested with the author.“easing” period. However, unless accompanied
by other FOMC meetings clearly calling for a
policy change, statements such as those calling
for an “unchanged policy with doubts resolved
on the side of ease” were interpreted as not call-
ing for a policy change.
Some important monthly economic time
series for the post-accord period are plotted in
Figure 12. The heavy vertical lines represent
periods of “stable,” “easing,” and “firming” policy
as indicated by “S,” “E,” and “F” at the bottom
of the figure. Except for the unemployment rate,
the average of each series for each policy period
has been plotted as a horizontal line.
The two features of the post-accord experi-
ence are especially noteworthy. First, decisions
to change policy have been taken about as close
to the time when, in retrospect, policy changes
were needed as could be expected in the light of
existing knowledge.15 There have been mistakes
in timing, but the overall record is impressive.
The second major feature of this period is that
policy actions, as opposed to policy decisions,
have been in the correct direction if policy actions
are defined by either free reserves or interest rates,
but not if policy actions are defined in terms of
either the money stock or bank credit.
To examine the timing question in more
detail, a useful comparison is that between busi-
ness cycle turning points (as defined by the
National Bureau of Economic Research) and
decisions to change policy. The post-accord period
begins at a time when the U.S. economy was beset
by inflation stemming from the war in Korea. the
dates of the principal changes in policy and of
the business cycle peaks and troughs are listed
in Table 2. The policy dates are those that define
the beginning of the “stable,” “easing,” and “firm-
ing” periods indicated in Figure 12.
The decision to ease policy was made prior
to the business cycle peaks of July 1953 and May
1960. The decision in 1957 was made in the fourth
month following the cycle peak in July, but as can
be seen from Figure 12, the unemployment rate
had not risen very much through October. Given
the amount of uncertainty always present in inter-
preting business conditions, this lag must be
considered to be well within the margin of error
to be expected for stabilization policy. However,
the easing policy decision in 1968 was clearly a
mistake in retrospect but not in prospect given
the expectations held by the majority of econo-
mists that the tax increase would significantly
temper the economic boom.
Firming policy decisions were also generally
well timed. Following the 1953-54 recession,
decisions to firm policy in small steps were taken
from December 1954 to September 1955, as unem-
ployment declined to about 4 percent of the labor
force. During the recovery period after the 1957-58
recession, firming decisions were taken from July
1958 to May 1959. There was also a series of firm-
ing decisions taken from the end of 1961 to 1966.
Especially noteworthy are those taken from
December 1965 to August 1966, in response to
the beginning of inflation associated with the
escalation of military activity in Vietnam. The
easing policy decisions taken in late 1966 and
early 1967 were fully appropriate in light of the
economic slack that developed in 1967.
Even from the point of view of those who
doubt the importance of fiscal policy, this record
of the timing of policy decisions in the post-accord
period is remarkably good. The timing record
does not suggest that much attention was paid to
forecasts, but this lack of attention was perhaps
not unfortunate given the accuracy of forecasts
during the period. From this point of view, the
only real mistake was the easing decision taken
in 1968. Of course, those who believe that a steady
rate of growth of the money stock is better than
any discretionary policy likely to be achieved in
practice may read this record as supporting their
thesis. But the post-accord record of the timing
of policy decisions is certainly encouraging to
those who believe that the lags in the effects of
policy are short enough, and the effects predict-
able enough, to make discretionary monetary
policy a powerful stabilization tool if only deci-
sions can be made promptly.
While the System’s performance in the timing
of policy decisions has been commendable, the
same cannot be said for the actions taken in
15 For additional views on the timing of Federal Reserve decisions,
see Brunner and Meltzer (1964) and Fels and Hinshaw (1968).
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Table 2
Dates of Principal Monetary Policy Decisions and of Business Cycle Peaks and Troughs
Business cycle FOMC policy decisions
Turning point Date Policy Starting date
Accord 1951 March 1-2
Firming 1952 September 25
Stable December 8
Peak 1953 July Easing 1953 June 11
Stable December 15
Trough 1954 August Firming 1954 December 11
Stable 1955 October 4
Peak 1957 July Easing 1957 November 12
Stable 1958 April 15
Trough 1958 April Firming July 29
Stable 1959 June 16
Peak 1960 May Easing 1960 March 1
Stable August 16
Trough 1961 February Firming 1961 October 24
Stable November 14
Firming 1962 June 19
Stable July 10
Firming December 18
Stable 1963 January 8
Firming May 7
Stable August 20
Firming 1964 August 18
Stable 1965 March 2
Firming December 14
Stable 1966 September 13
Easing November 1
Stable 1967 May 2
Firming November 27




Stable 1969 April 29Poole
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Figure 12
Post-Accord Monetary Policy
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 154.Poole
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Figure 12, cont’d
Post-Accord Monetary Policy
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 155.response to the decisions. In the earlier discussion
the purposely vague terms “easing,” “firming,”
and “stable” were used to describe policy deci-
sions. These terms were meant to convey the
notions that policymakers wanted, respectively,
to accelerate, decelerate, or maintain the pace of
economic advance. The question that must now
be examined is whether policy actions did in fact
tend to accelerate, decelerate, or maintain the
level of economic activity.
Policy actions were in accord with policy
decisions if these actions are measured by either
the 3-month Treasury bill rate or free reserves. The
bill rate rose in “firming” periods, fell in “easing”
periods, and tended to remain unchanged in
“stable” periods. However, there was some ten-
dency for the bill rate to rise in “stable” periods
following “firming” periods, and to fall in “stable”
periods following “easing” periods, a pattern not
inconsistent with the interpretation of policy
being offered in this study. Similar comments
apply to free reserves.
But the picture is quite different if policy
actions are measured by the rate of growth of the
money stock. Careful study of Figure 12 will make
this point clear. The growth rate declined in
response to the “firming” policy decision in late
1952, and again in the “stable” period in early
1953. This behavior was, of course, consistent
with the “firming” decision. But the rate of growth
declined further following the “easing” decision
in June 1953 and remained low until the middle
of 1954. The unemployment rate rose rapidly
from its low of 2.6 percent at the cycle peak in
July 1953 to 6.0 percent in August 1954, the cycle
trough; the money stock was at the same level in
April 1954, 9 months following the cycle peak
and 10 months following the decision to adopt
an “easing” policy, as it had been at the peak.
The same pattern that had appeared during
the 1953-54 recession appeared again at the time
of the 1957-58 recession. The rate of growth of
the money stock declined in 1957 prior to the
cycle peak. (The Treasury bill rate also rose sub-
stantially.) But after the decision to adopt an
“easing” policy in November 1957, the growth
rate of the money stock declined further. From
October 1957 to January 1958, the money stock
fell at a 2.9 percent annual rate; from the cycle
peak in July to October it had fallen at a 1.5 per-
cent annual rate.
The rate of growth of the money stock
increased substantially in February 1958, and it
remained at the higher level during the “stable”
policy period April to July. There followed a
period of “firming” policy decisions from the end
of July 1958 to May 1959; however, the average
growth rate of the money stock during this period
was virtually identical to the average in the pre-
ceding “stable” period. But in the “stable” period
from June 1959 to February 1960, the rate of
growth of money, at –2.2 percent, was much lower
than in the preceding “firming” period. This rate
of growth of money can hardly be considered
appropriate in the light of the fact that except for
one month the unemployment rate was continu-
ously above 5 percent. However, the picture was
confused by a long steel strike.
The decision to ease policy was taken on
March 1, 1960, but the rate of growth of the money
stock remained negative until July. The rate of
growth of money fell following the “firming”
policy decisions of October 1961 and June 1962.
In spite of another firming decision in December
1962 the rate of growth then increased, and it
continued to rise during the “firming” period in
1963, maintaining the same rate in the following
“stable” period. In August 1964, another “firming”
decision was taken, and the growth rate trended
down during the “firming” period from August
1964 to February 1965.
During the “stable” period from March to
November 1965, the Vietnam war heated up. In
the second half of 1965 the growth rate of money
was 6.1 percent compared with 3.0 percent during
the first half. The “firming” policy decision came
in December, but the rate of growth of money
averaged over 6 percent for the months December
through April 1966. At this point monetary growth
ceased. In January 1967 the money stock was
actually less than in May 1966—there having
been no increase in the growth rate in the months
immediately following the “easing” decision of
November 1, 1966.
The growth rate of money then accelerated
during the “stable” period from May through
Poole
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averaged 8.7 percent. In the following “firming”
period November 1967 through April 1968, the
rate of growth of the money stock was lower but it
was still relatively high at 5.1 percent. The growth
rate then rose to 9.6 percent in the “stable” period
May through July 1968 and thereafter fell to a little
less than 6 percent in the July-November 1968
period following the “easing” decision of July 16,
1968.
There ensued a “firming” period from
December 1968 through April 1969. Although
original figures indicated that monetary growth
was relatively little during this period, a revision
in the money stock series showed that the rate
averaged 5.5 percent for the period as a whole.
The rate following April was lower, especially in
the June-December 1969 period, which saw no
net growth in the money stock.
A broadly similar view of the timing of policy
actions is obtained from a careful examination of
the rate of growth of total bank credit. However,
as shown in Figure 12, this series is quite erratic
and much more difficult to interpret than the
series on the rate of growth of the money stock.
The proper way to interpret these results
would seem to be as follows. When interest rates
fell in a recession, policy was easier than it would
have been if interest rates had not been permitted
to fall. But if the money stock was also falling, or
growing at a below-average rate, policy was
tighter than it would have been had money been
growing at its long-run average rate. Similar state-
ments apply to rising interest rates and above-
average monetary growth in a boom.
A Monetary Rule
Given the arguments of Sections I and II on
the advantages of controlling the money stock as
opposed to interest rates, a logical first step in
developing a policy guideline is to examine cases
clearly calling for ease or restraint. Consider first
a recession. To insure that monetary policy is
expansionary, the rule might be that interest rates
should fall and the money stock should rise at
an above-average rate. This policy avoids two
possible errors.
The first is illustrated in Figure 13. If the IS
function shifts down from IS1 to IS2 while the LM
function shifts from LM1 to LM2, the interest rate
will fall from r1 to r2. The shift from LM1 to LM2
could be caused by a shift in the demand for
money with the stock of money unchanged. But
this shift could also be caused by a decline in the
stock of money, perhaps because of an attempt
by policymakers to keep the interest rate from
falling too rapidly. However, in terms of income
it is clearly better to permit the interest rate to fall
to r3 by maintaining the stock of money fixed, and
better yet to shift the LM function to the right of
LM1 by increasing the stock of money.
The point is the simple one that monetary
policy should not rely simply on a declining
interest rate in recession but should also insure
that the money stock is growing at an adequate
rate. The LM function may still shift to LM2 in
spite of monetary growth because of an increased
demand for money; without the monetary growth,
however, this shift in the demand for money
would push the LM function to the left of LM2 and
income would be even lower.
The second type of error avoided by the pro-
posed policy rule is illustrated in Figure 14. Again,
it is assumed that the situation is one of recession.
With a fixed money stock, an increase in the
demand for money will shift the LM function
from LM1 to LM2, tending to reduce income. How-
ever, if the interest rate is prevented from rising
above r1, the increased demand for money is met
by an increased supply of money.
Maintaining monetary growth and a declining
interest rate in recession insures that the contri-
bution of monetary policy is expansive. Increases
in the demand for money, unless accompanied
by a falling IS function, are fully offset by prevent-
ing increases in the interest rate. The greater the
fall in the IS function the smaller the offset to an
increased demand for money. However, in no
case should a fall in the IS function be permitted
to cause a fall in the money stock.
The policy proposed does not, of course,
guarantee an expansion of income. No such guar-
antee is possible because downward shifts in the
IS function may exceed any specified shift in the
LM function. But more important than theoretical
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practical purposes the problem is not how to
insure expansion in a recession but how to trade
off the risks of too much expansion against too
little. The discussion of Figures 13 and 14 was
entirely in terms of encouraging income expan-
sion, or limiting further declines, in the face of
depressing disturbances. But disturbances may
be expansionary in a recession, and such distur-
bances may combine with expansionary policy
to create overly rapid recovery from the recession.
Consider again Figure 13, but suppose the
initial position is as shown by IS2 and LM2. If the
interest rate is not permitted to rise, a shift to IS1
will lead to a large increase in income to the level
given by the intersection of IS1 with a horizontal
LM function drawn at r2. This situation can be
avoided only if the interest rate is permitted to
rise. The natural question is how the interest rate
can be permitted to rise within a recession policy
of pushing the interest rate down and maintain-
ing above-average monetary growth. The answer
is that the recession policy should be followed
only if the interest rate can be kept from rising
with a monetary growth rate below some upper
bound.
Exactly the same analysis running in reverse
applies to a policy for checking an inflationary
boom. In a boom interest rates should rise and
monetary growth should be below average. How-
ever, there must be a lower limit on monetary
growth to avoid an unduly contractionary policy.
Having presented the basic ideas behind the for-
mulation of a monetary rule, it is now necessary
to become more specific about the rule. After
specifying the rule in detail, it will be possible to
discuss the considerations behind the specific
numbers chosen.
The proposed monetary policy rule-of-thumb
is given in Table 3. The rule assumes that full
employment exists when unemployment is in the
4.0 to 4.4 percent range and that monetary growth
in the 3 to 5 percent range is consistent with price
stability. At full employment the Treasury bill rate
may rise or fall, either because of market pressures
or because of small adjustments in monetary
Poole
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Figure 14
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 159.
Figure 13
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 159.policy; however, monetary growth should remain
in the 3 to 5 percent range.
When unemployment drops below 4 percent,
the rule calls for a restrictive monetary policy.
The bill rate should rise and monetary growth
should be reduced. If the bill rate and monetary
growth guidelines are not compatible, then the
monetary guideline should be binding. For exam-
ple, suppose that unemployment is in the 3.5 to
3.9 percent range. If monetary growth below 2
percent would be required to obtain a rising bill
rate, then monetary growth should be 2 percent
and the bill rate be permitted to fall. If this situa-
tion persists so that the bill rate falls for several
months in spite of the low monetary growth, then
the limits on monetary growth should be increased
as indicated in footnote 2 to Table 3. The reason
for this prescription is that the bill rate on the
average turns down 1 month before the peak of
the business cycle (Holt, 1962, p. 111). Unemploy-
ment, on the other hand, may increase relatively
little in the early months following a cycle peak.
Tying monetary growth to the bill rate in the way
indicated in footnote 2 of Table 3 produces a more
timely adjustment of policy than relying on the
unemployment rate alone.
The proposed rule calls for a falling bill rate
and a relatively higher rate of monetary growth
as unemployment rises above the 4.0 to 4.4 per-
cent range. The rule for high unemployment sit-
uations calls for adjusting the monetary growth
rate downward when the bill rate is consistently
rising as indicated by footnote 3 to Table 3. The
reasoning behind this adjustment is exactly par-
allel to the reasoning above for low unemployment
situations.
The proposed monetary rule has the virtues
of simplicity and dependence on relatively well-
established economic doctrine. Because of its
simplicity, the basic ideas behind the rule can be
explained to the noneconomist. The simplicity of
the rule also will make possible relatively easy
evaluations of the rule’s performance in the future
if the rule is followed. With more complicated
rules it would be much more difficult to know
how to improve the rule in the future because it
would be difficult to judge what part of the rule
was unsatisfactory. Since, as has been repeatedly
emphasized above, the rule is not proposed as
being good for all time, it is best to start with a
simple rule and then gradually to introduce more
variables into the rule as experience accumulates.
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Table 3
Proposed Monetary Policy Rule-of-Thumb (Percent)
Rule for month*
Direction of Treasury bill rate Growth of money stock













NOTE: *The 3-month bill rate is to be adjusted in the indicated direction provided that monetary growth is in the indicated range. If
the bill rate change cannot be achieved within the monetary growth rate guideline, then the bill rate guideline should be abandoned.
†If the bill rate the previous month was below the bill rate 3 months prior to that, then the upper and lower limits on monetary growth
are both increased by 1 percent. ‡If the bill rate the previous month was above the bill rate 3 months prior to that, then the upper and
lower limits on monetary growth are both reduced by 1 percent.In designing the rule, the attempt was made to
base the rule on fairly well-established economic
knowledge. There is, of course, a great deal of
debate as to just what is and what is not well
established. What can be done, and must be done,
is to explain as carefully as possible the assump-
tions upon which the rule is based, with full recog-
nition that other economists may not accept these
assumptions.
First, the evidence for the importance of
money is impressive. It seems fair to say that very
few economists believe today that changes in the
stock of money have nothing to do with business
fluctuations. Rather, the argument is over the
extent to which monetary factors are important.
Some no doubt will feel that the 2-percentage-
point ranges on monetary growth specified by the
rule are excessively narrow; however, it should
be noted that a 4 percent growth rate is double a
2 percent growth rate. Also important is the fact
that the rule is meant to serve as a guideline rather
than be absolutely binding. Since policy should
deviate from the rule if there is good and sufficient
reason—such as wartime panic buying—a further
element of flexibility exists within the framework
of the rule.
The rule is specified in terms of changes in
the bill rate and the monetary growth rate, with
the monetary growth rate being tied to the unem-
ployment rate and to changes in the bill rate in the
recent past. This formulation has been designed
to avoid what seem to be the most obvious errors
of the past. Over the years the monetary growth
rate has been lowest at business cycle peaks and
in the early stages of business contractions, and
highest at cycle troughs and in the middle stages
of business expansions. The highest rate of mon-
etary growth since the Treasury–Federal Reserve
accord has been during the inflation associated
with escalation of military operations in Vietnam.
For purposes of smoothing the business cycle, so
far as this author knows, there is no theory pro-
pounded by any economist that would call for
high monetary growth during inflationary booms
and low monetary growth during recessions. Such
behavior of the money stock could only be optimal
within a theory in which money had little or no
effect on business fluctuations and in which other
goals such as interest rate stability were important.
Being based on the unemployment rate and
bill rate changes in the recent past, the proposed
monetary rule does not rely on forecasting. Nor
does the rule depend on the current and projected
stance of fiscal policy. Both of these factors ought
to be included in applying the rule by adjusting
the rate of growth of the money stock within the
rule limits, or even by going outside the limits.
But given the accuracy of economic forecasts
under present methods, and given the current
uncertainty over the size of the impact of fiscal
policy (not to mention the hazards in forecasting
federal receipts and expenditures), it does not
appear that these variables can be systematically
incorporated into a rule at the current state of
knowledge.
Tests of the Proposed Rule
Threetypesofevidenceonthevalueoftherule
are examined below. The first approach involves
a simple comparison of the rule with the histori-
cal record to show that the rule would generally
have been more expansionary (contractionary)
than actual policy when actual policy—in the light
of subsequent economic developments—might be
judged to have been too contractionary (expan-
sionary). The second approach examines the
cyclical behavior of the estimated residuals from
a simple demand for money function to show that
it is unlikely that the proposed rule would inter-
act with the disturbances to produce an exces-
sively inflationary or deflationary impact. Both
these approaches are deficient because they rely
heavily on the historical record, a record that
would have been quite different had the rule been
followed in the past. To avoid this difficulty, a
third approach uses simulation of the FR-MIT
model, but the results do not appear very useful
because of shortcomings in this model.
An Impressionistic Examination of the Rule.
Broadly speaking, the results of comparing the
rule with the historical record since the Treasury–
Federal Reserve accord in March 1951 are these.
The rule would have provided a substantially
tighter monetary policy than the actual during
the inflationary period from the accord until
about September 1952. At that point, actual
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of the money stock and by the 3-month bill rate
became considerably tighter. In the last quarter
of 1952, actual policy was in accord with the
rule, but thereafter it tightened even further. In
the 9 months following the cyclical peak in July
1953, the money stock had a zero rate of growth
while the unemployment rate rose from 2.6 per-
cent to 5.9 percent. Under the rule the rate of
growth of the money stock would never have
gone below 1 percent and would have steadily
increased as unemployment rose.
Actual policy became more expansive in the
second quarter of 1954, and the cycle trough was
reached in August. However, the rule would have
been considerably more expansive, and it would
have remained more expansive than the actual
all through the 1955-56 boom. Inasmuch as the
unemployment rate remained near 4.0 percent
from May 1955 through August 1957, the rule
would have been too inflationary during this
period. However, it can be argued that monetary
policy was overly restrictive before the cycle peak
in July 1957, since in the year prior to the peak
the money stock grew only by 0.7 percent. Less
subject to dispute is the fact that policy was far
too restrictive after the peak; in the 6 months
following the peak the money stock fell at an
annual rate of 2.2 percent, and at the same time
the unemployment rate rose from 4.2 percent to
5.8 percent.
The rule would have been considerably more
expansive all during the high unemployment
period of 1958-59, and it would have prevented
the declines in the money stock in late 1959 and
early 1960. At the peak in May 1960 the unem-
ployment rate was 5. 1 percent, and the money
stock had fallen by 2.1 percent in the previous
12 months. Unlike the periods following peaks
in 1954 and 1957, policy became more expansive
immediately after the May 1960 peak, although
not so expansive as called for by the proposed
rule.
From the trough in February 1961 through
June 1964, the unemployment rate never declined
below 5 percent. Under the rule, policy would
have been more expansive than the actual policy
followed throughout this period, especially as
compared with the March-September 1962 period,
during which the money stock fell slightly. Unem-
ployment fell rapidly in 1965 with the Vietnam
build-up; the rule would have been more expan-
sive than actual through July 1965 and then less
expansive than actual through April 1966. Indeed,
in the 9-month period prior to April 1966, with
the unemployment rate falling from 4.4 percent
to 3.8 percent, monetary growth accelerated to a
6.6 percent annual rate; the proposed rule would
have first called for monetary growth in the 3 to
5 percent range, and then in the 2 to 4 percent
range starting in February 1966, following the
drop in the unemployment rate below 4.0 percent
in January. Finally, the negative growth rates of
money in the 1966 credit crunch would have
been avoided under the rule, as would the high
rates of growth in 1967 and 1968.
This impressionistic look at the proposed
rule may be supplemented by a simple scoring
system for judging when the rule would have
been in error. For each month during the sample
period it was determined whether the rule would
have been more or less expansive than the actual
policy, or about the same as the actual policy. The
unemployment rate 12 months from the month
in question was used to indicate whether or not
the policy was correct, with a desired range of
unemployment of 4.0 to 4.4 percent. The rule was
deemed to have made an error if: (1) the actual
policy was in accord with the rule, but unemploy-
ment 12 months later was not in the desired range;
(2) the rule called for a more expansive policy
than the actual, and unemployment 12 months
later was below the desired range; and (3) the
rule called for a less expansive policy than the
actual, and unemployment 12 months later was
above the desired range.
Since the latest data used in this analysis
were for July 1969, comparison of the rule with
actual policy ends July 1968. Starting the sample
with 1952, the first full year after the accord, pro-
vides a total of 199 months. Based on the criterion
described above, the rule would have been in
error in 63 months. If the criterion is changed by
substituting the unemployment rate 9 months
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62 errors; using the unemployment rate 6 months
ahead yields 59 errors.
Some of these errors are of negligible import.
For example, in March 1953 the rule calls for a
money growth rate of 2 to 4 percent, but the actual
was 1.9 percent. Thus, the rule would have been
more expansive than the actual this particular
month, a mistake since unemployment was too
low and inflation too high during this period.
However, the rule would have been less expan-
sive than actual in every one of the preceding 6
months and in all but one of the 6 months follow-
ing this “mistake.” Except for scattered errors
such as the one just discussed, most of the rule
errors occurred in two separate periods. The first
is the 2-year period following the cycle trough in
August 1954, during which time the rule would
have been too expansive. The second is the last
half of 1964 and the first half of 1965, when the
rule would have been too expansive in light of
the subsequent sharp decline in unemployment.
Unless one has completed a careful examina-
tion of the data, there is a tendency to underesti-
mate how rapidly the economy can change. For
example, from the cycle peak in July 1953 to the
cycle trough 13 months later, the unemployment
rate rose by 3.4 percentage points; and from the
peak in July 1957 to the trough 9 months later in
April 1958, it rose by 3.2 percentage points.
Changes in the other direction have tended to be
somewhat less rapid, but significant nonetheless.
In the year following the trough in August 1954,
the unemployment rate declined 2.0 percentage
points, and it declined 2.2 percentage points in
the year following the trough in April 1958. In
January 1965 unemployment was 4.8 percent and
the problem was still one of how to reach full
employment. A year later the rate was 3.9 percent
and the problem was inflation.
Thus, it appears that for the most part the rule
would have been superior to policy actually fol-
lowed. Of course, the rule is not infallible and
would have erred on a number of occasions. But
in spite of these errors—and it should be recog-
nized that some errors are inevitable no matter
what rule or which discretionary policymakers
are in charge—the proposed rule has the great
virtue of turning policy around promptly as
imbalances develop.
Relationship of the Rule to Monetary
Disturbances. Since the rule was developed on
the basis of the theoretical and empirical analysis
of Sections I and II, which emphasized the rela-
tive stability of the demand for money, it is appro-
priate to conduct a systematic examination of
the disturbances in the demand for money. It
will be recalled that the rule was formulated in
such a way as to insure expansionary policy
action in a recession and contractionary policy
action in a boom. However, it was recognized
that disturbances in the expenditure sector and/or
in the monetary sector might reinforce policy
actions leading to an excessively expansionary
or contractionary effect on income. If there were
a significant chance of these excessive effects
occurring, then the rule proposed would be overly
“aggressive” and a rule involving a smaller range
of monetary growth rates would be in order.
To provide some evidence of the effect of
disturbances in the money demand function, the
residuals from the simple velocity function tested
in Section II were examined carefully. The tech-
nique involved regressing velocity on the Aaa cor-
porate bond rate, and vice versa, for the 1947-68
period and then comparing the residuals with
turning points in the business cycle. The reader
may make these comparisons visually from
Figure 15. At the bottom of this figure cycle
peaks and troughs are identified by “P” and “T,”
respectively.
The residuals from the estimated equations
suggest that the demand for money has contrac-
tionary disturbances near business cycle peaks
and expansionary disturbances near cycle troughs.
The residuals have the same turning points for
the regression of velocity on the interest rate as
for the regression of the interest rate on velocity.
The residual peaks occur at or before the cycle
peaks, while the residual troughs occur at or
after the cycle troughs.
To assess the significance of these endings,
consider the following simple view as to the
dynamics of monetary elects. In the short run,
income is a predetermined variable in the demand
for money function. An increase in the money
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be otherwise, and this eventually leads to expan-
sion in investment and income. A downward
disturbance in the demand for money function
has the same effect.
Given this view of monetary dynamics,
Figure 15 suggests the following conclusions.
Shifts in the demand for money tend to be con-
tractive in their effect on income in the late stages
of a business cycle expansion, implying that a
restrictive monetary policy must not be pushed
too hard. Then, shortly before the cycle peak, the
shifts apparently tend to become expansive. This
effect is fortunate since it is only after the cycle
peak that rising unemployment would trigger a
policy change under the proposed rule. However,
there appears to be little danger that the rule would
be overly expansionary because after the cycle
trough, while policy is still expansionary, con-
tractive shifts in the demand for money occur.
Simulations of the FR-MIT Model. The final
technique used to test the proposed monetary
rule was to simulate the FR-MIT model under
the rule. As explained below, the results are of
questionable value but are presented anyway
for the sake of completeness and in order not to
suppress results unfavorable to the proposed rule.
To simplify the computer programming, the
rule used in the simulations is not exactly the
same as the one proposed in Table 3 above. The
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Figure 15
Residuals from Velocity Regression Compared with Business-Cycle Turning Points
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 164.Poole
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Figure 16
Simulations of Unemployment in FR-MIT Model
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 165.proposed rule, it will be recalled, involved a bill
rate guideline and a money stock guideline. If, for
example, the bill rate cannot be pushed up with-
out pushing monetary growth below the lower
limit in the money guideline, the proposed rule
calls for setting monetary growth at its lower limit.
The simulation rule, on the other hand, ignores
the bill rate guideline and simply sets the mone-
tary growth rate at the midpoint of the range speci-
fied by the proposed rule.
Another difference, and no doubt a more
important one, between the proposed rule and the
simulation rule is that the simulation rule had to
be specified in terms of quarterly data since the
FR-MIT model uses quarterly data. In the simu-
lation rule, the growth rate of the money stock
depends on the level of unemployment deter-
mined by the model in the previous quarter. The
growth rate of the money stock was modified by
past changes in the bill rate, as in footnotes 2 and 3
to Table 3, except that the relevant bill rate change
was in terms of the previous quarter before that.
The simulation rule, then, reacts somewhat more
slowly to unemployment trends than does the
proposed rule.
In order to investigate the importance of the
starting point, simulations were run with starting
dates in the first quarters of 1956, 1958, 1960,
1962, and 1964. The simulated unemployment
rate for the five simulations is shown in the five
panels of Figure 16 by the curves marked “S.”
The actual unemployment rate is shown by the
curves marked “A” and control simulations, to
be explained below, by the unconnected points.
It is clear from Figure 16 that the simulation
rule for money growth produces an unstable
unemployment rate. However, because of defi-
ciencies in the model this result is probably not
very meaningful. That the model is defective can
be seen by comparing unemployment in the con-
trol simulations with the actual unemployment.
In the control simulations all of the model’s exoge-
nous variables, including the money stock, were
set at their actual levels.16 Even with the exoge-
nous variables set at their actual levels, the simu-
lated level of unemployment at times differs from
the actual level.
Because of the role of the stochastic distur-
bances in the model, especially as they feed
through lagged endogenous variables, it cannot
be expected that control simulations will exactly
duplicate the actual results. But the fact that the
control simulations differ from the actual by
considerable margins over long periods of time
strongly suggests that the money rule simulations
do not provide much useful information on the
properties of the proposed rule.
The simulations are valuable in one respect,
however. An examination of Figure 16 strongly
suggests that the money rule is interacting with
the rest of the model to produce a cycle of 5 to 6
years. Such a cycle is particularly evident in the
simulations starting in 1956 and 1958. That the
monetary rule has very powerful effects in the
model is shown by the simulations beginning in
1960 and 1962. In both simulations unemploy-
ment reaches a trough in 1964 and then rises in
spite of the 1964-65 tax cuts and the stimulus of
spending for military operations in Vietnam start-
ing at the end of 1965.
There is no doubt that the monetary rule is
too aggressive within the context of the FR-MIT
model. A simulation of a perfectly steady rate of
growth of money is shown in Figure 17. The rate
of growth in this simulation is 2.76 percent per
year, the same as the actual rate of growth over
the period 1955-IV through 1969-I. In Figure 17,
the curve labeled S2 is the simulated unemploy-
ment rate with the steady rate of growth of money.
The simulated unemployment rate under the
monetary rule is shown by S1, which is the same
as S in panel A of Figure 16. The unconnected
points show the same control simulation as shown
in panel A of Figure 16.
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16 The FR-MIT model was estimated with the money stock as an
endogenous variable. There are separate equations for currency
and demand deposits, both of which are endogenous, while unbor-
rowed reserves are exogenous. In the simulations the money stock
was made exogenous by suppressing the equation that makes
demand deposits depend on unborrowed reserves. To simulate
the effects of a particular rate of growth of money, the currency
equation was retained, but demand deposits were set at whatever
level was required to obtain the desired rate of growth of demand
deposits plus currency. In the control simulations demand deposits
were set at their actual levels, but currency remained an endoge-
nous variable and differed somewhat from actual since simulated
GNP differed somewhat from actual GNP.It appears impossible to draw any firm con-
clusions from the simulations. However, the
simulations clearly raise the possibility that the
proposed monetary rule may produce economic
instability. If anything, the proposed rule is too
aggressive, and so policy should probably err on
the side of producing growth rates in money closer
to a steady 3 to 5 percent rather than farther from
the extremes in the proposed rule.
IV. SELECTION AND CONTROL
OF A MONETARY AGGREGATE
Basic Issues
Up to this point, the analysis has been entirely
in terms of optimal control of the money stock.
The theoretical analysis has been general enough
that no precise definition of the money stock has
been required. The empirical work, however, has
used the narrow definition of demand deposits
adjusted plus currency, for the simple reason that
this definition seems to be the most appropriate
one.
In principle there is no reason not to look
simultaneously at all of the aggregates and, of
course, at all other information as well. But in
practice, at the present state of knowledge, there
simply is no way of knowing how all of these
various measures ought to be combined.17 Further-
more, the selection of a single aggregate for oper-
ating purposes would permit the FOMC to be far
more precise in its policy deliberations and in its
instructions to the Manager of the Open Market
Account. Thus, the best procedure would seem
to be to select one aggregate as the policy control
variable, and insofar as the state of knowledge
permits, to incorporate other information into
policy by making appropriate adjustments in the
rate of growth of the aggregate selected.
In principle the aggregate singled out as the
control variable should be subject to exact deter-
mination by the Federal Reserve. The reason is
that errors in reaching an aggregate that cannot
be precisely controlled may interact with distur-
bances in the relationships between the aggregate
and goal variables such as GNP to produce a sub-
optimal policy. However, as argued later in this
section, this consideration is likely to be quite
unimportant in practice for any of the aggregates
commonly considered. Therefore, the analysis of
which aggregate should be singled out will be
conducted under the assumption that all of the
various aggregates can be precisely controlled by
the Federal Reserve.
Selection of a Monetary Aggregate
At the outset it must be emphasized that the
various aggregates frequently discussed are all
highly correlated with one another in the post-
war period. This is true for total bank credit, the
narrow money stock, the broad money stock (nar-
row money stock plus time deposits), the bank
credit proxy (total member bank deposits), the
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Figure 17
Simulations of FR-MIT Model
SOURCE: Originally published version, p. 166.
17 This point is an especially important one since those favoring
simple approaches are frequently castigated for ignoring relevant
information, and for applying “simplistic solutions to inherently
complex problems.” For this charge to be upheld, it must be shown
explicitly and in detail how this other information is to be used,
and evidence must be produced to support the proposed complex
approach. As far as this author knows, there is essentially no evi-
dence sorting out the separate effects of various components of
monetary aggregates.monetary base (member bank reserves plus cur-
rency held by the public and nonmember banks),
and several other figures that can be computed.
While these various aggregates are highly
correlated over substantial periods of time, they
show significantly different trends for short
periods. In selecting an aggregate, the most impor-
tant considerations are the theoretical relevance
of the aggregate and the extent to which the the-
oretical notions have been given empirical sup-
port. Both of these considerations point to the
selection of the narrowly defined money stock.
The most important theoretical dispute is
between those who emphasize the importance of
bank deposit liabilities—the “monetary” view—
and those who emphasize the importance of
banks’ earning assets—the “credit” view. This
controversy, which dates back well into the 19th
century, is difficult to resolve because historically
banks have operated on a fractional reserve basis
and so have had both earning assets and deposit
liabilities. Since balance sheets must balance,
bank credit and bank deposits are perfectly corre-
lated except insofar as there are changes in non-
earning assets—such as reserves—or nondeposit
liabilities—such as borrowing from the Federal
Reserve System. If these factors never changed,
the perfect correlation between bank deposits and
bank credit would make it impossible ever to
obtain evidence to distinguish between the mone-
tary and the credit views. Since the correlation,
while not perfect, has historically been very high,
it has been very difficult to obtain evidence.
Hence, it is still necessary to place major reliance
on theoretical reasoning.
There would be little reason to examine the
issue closely if we could be confident that the
very high correlation between deposits and bank
credit would continue into the indefinite future.
But there are already substantial differences in
the short-run movements of bank credit and bank
deposits, and these differences are likely to become
greater and of a longer-term character in the future.
Banks are raising increasingly large amounts of
funds through nondeposit sources such as sales
of commercial paper and of capital certificates
and through borrowing from the Euro-dollar mar-
ket and the Federal Reserve System. (Borrowings
from the System would probably expand signifi-
cantly if proposed changes in discount-window
administration were implemented.)
The easiest way to examine the theoretical
issues is to consider some hypothetical experi-
ments. Consider first the experiment in which
the Federal Reserve raises reserve requirements
by $10 billion at the initial level of deposits but
simultaneously buys $10 billion in U.S. govern-
ment securities in the open market. Deposits need
not change, but banks must hold more reserves
and fewer earning assets. Under the monetary
view the effects would be nil (except for very
minor effects examined below) because deposits
would be unchanged, but under the credit view
the effect would be a tendency for income to con-
tract because bank credit would be lower.
The monetary view is easily explained. Sup-
pose first that the banks initially hold U.S. govern-
ment securities in excess of $10 billion. When
reserve requirements are raised, the banks simply
sell $10 billion of these securities, and this is
exactly the amount being purchased by the Federal
Reserve. Thus, since deposits are unchanged
and bank loans to the nonbank private sector—
hereinafter called simply the “private sector”—
are also unchanged, there should be no effects
on that sector.
Now suppose that the banks do not have $10
billion in government securities. In this case they
must sell private securities, say corporate bonds,
to the private sector. The private sector obtains
the funds to buy these bonds from the sale of $10
billion of government securities to the Federal
Reserve. The amount of credit in the private sector
is again unchanged. The banks own fewer private
securities, while the public owns more private
securities and fewer government securities.
Thus, the amount of credit extended to the
private sector need not change at all even though
bank credit falls. However, two minor effects are
possible: First, the Federal Reserve purchase of
government securities changes the composition
of portfolios. Thus, even if banks have over $10
billion of government securities, they may be
expected to adjust their portfolios by selling some
government securities and some private securities.
For ease of exposition, run-offs of loans may be
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result, then, is that the banks have more reserves,
fewer government securities, and fewer private
securities; the private sector has fewer government
securities and fewer liabilities to the banks. The
private sector may have—but it will not neces-
sarily have—fewer claims within the sector. It is
quite possible that private units may substitute
claims on other private units for the government
securities sold to the Federal Reserve.
Looked at from the liability side, those units
initially with liabilities outstanding to banks may
have those liabilities shifted to other private sec-
tor units. This occurs, of course, when banks sell
securities to the private sector or allow loans to
run off that are then replaced by firms selling com-
mercial paper to other firms, drawing on sources
of trade credit, and/or borrowing from nonbank
financial institutions. A net effect can occur only
when the combined portfolios of banks and the
private sector contain fewer government securities,
though more reserves, than before; such a change
may be looked upon as a reduction in liquidity
and thereby lead to a greater demand for money
and a reduced willingness to undertake additional
expenditures on goods and services.
The second effect of the hypothetical experi-
ment being discussed is that bank earnings will
be reduced by the increase in reserve require-
ments. Banks will eventually adjust by raising
service charges on demand deposits and/or reduc-
ing interest paid on time deposits. For simplicity,
assume that the change in reserve requirements
applies only to demand deposits so that there is
no reason for banks to change the interest paid
on time deposits. With higher service charges on
demand deposits, lower interest rates on securi-
ties are required if people are to hold the same
stock of money as before. Since the hypothetical
experiment assumed that deposits did not change,
interest rates must fall by the same amount as the
increase in service charges, an effect that will tend
to expand investment and national income.
The portfolio effect tends to contract income
while the service charge effect tends to expand
income. These effects individually seem likely
to be small, and the net effect may well be nil. In
this regard, it is interesting to note that the rela-
tionship of velocity to the Aaa corporate bond rate
is about the same for observations in the 1950’s
as in the 1920’s (Latané, 1954, 1960) in spite of
the enormous changes in financial structure and
in government bonds outstanding.
Consider another hypothetical experiment—
one that is in fact not so hypothetical at the cur-
rent time. Suppose that banks suddenly start
issuing large amounts of commercial paper and
investing the proceeds in business loans. It is
possible that the loans simply go to corporations
that have stopped issuing their own commercial
paper. In this case the bank would be purely a
middleman with no effect on the aggregate amount
of commercial paper outstanding. The increase
in bank credit would not represent an increase
in total credit.
But, of course, banks issuing commercial
paper must perform some function. This function
is clearly that of increasing the efficiency of the
financial sector in transferring funds from the
ultimate savers to the ultimate borrowers. The
efficiencies arise in several ways. First, under
fractional reserve banking, banks have naturally
developed expertise in lending. It is efficient to
make use of this expertise by permitting banks to
have more lendable funds than they would have
if restricted to demand deposits alone. The effi-
ciency takes the form of fewer administrative
resources being required to transfer funds from
savers to borrowers.
The second form of efficiency results from
the fact that financial markets function best when
there is a large amount of trading in a standard-
ized instrument. For example, the shares of large
corporations are much more easily marketed than
those of small corporations. Many investors want,
and require, readily marketable securities, and
they can be persuaded to buy securities in small
firms only if the yields are high. As a result funds
may go to large corporations to finance relatively
low-yielding investment projects while high-
yielding projects available to small firms cannot
be financed. Commercial banks, and other finan-
cial intermediaries, improve the allocation of
capital by issuing relatively standardized securi-
ties with good markets and lending the proceeds
to small firms.
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economic activity from an increase in bank credit
financed by commercial paper—assuming that
the money stock is not affected. To begin with, it
must be emphasized that an increase in the effi-
ciency of investment does not necessarily affect
the total of investment. The same resources may
be absorbed either in building a factory that will
produce a product that cannot be sold or in build-
ing a factory to produce a highly profitable prod-
uct in great demand.
Banks, and financial intermediaries in gen-
eral, have the effect of reducing somewhat the
cost of capital for small firms. Because interme-
diaries bid funds away from large corporations,
the cost of capital for large corporations tends to
be somewhat higher than it would be if there were
no intermediaries. At this stage in the analysis
the net effect on investment is impossible to pre-
dict since it depends on whether the reduction
in investment by large corporations is larger or
smaller than the increase in investment by small
corporations.
In examining the effects of intermediation,
however, another factor must be considered. Sup-
pose it is assumed that the interest rates relevant
for the demand for money are rates on high-quality
securities. It was argued above that intermediation
tends unambiguously to raise the yields on high-
quality securities above what they otherwise
would be. Since the assumption throughout has
been that the stock of money is unchanged, the
level of income must increase if the quantity of
money demanded is to be unchanged with the
higher interest rate of high-quality securities. The
conclusion, therefore, is that the increase in bank
credit is expansionary in the hypothetical experi-
ment being discussed.
This conclusion, however, does not warrant
the further conclusion that bank credit is the
appropriate monetary aggregate for policy pur-
poses. The effect examined above occurs when
any financial intermediary expands. Not only is
there the problem that data for all intermediaries
are simply not available on a current basis but
also there are serious problems in even defining
an intermediary. A particularly good example of
this difficulty is afforded by trade credit. A large
nonfinancial corporation may advance trade credit
to customers, many of whom may be small, and
may also advance funds to suppliers through
prepayments. The large corporation finances
these forms of credit through the sale of securities,
or through retained earnings diverted from its
own investment opportunities and/or from divi-
dends. In this case the large corporation is serving
exactly the same function as the financial inter-
mediaries are. But tracing these credit flows is
obviously impossible at the present time.
Another problem with bank credit as a guide
to policy is that changes in bank credit depend
both on changes in bank deposits and on changes
in nondeposit sources of funds. As demonstrated
by the hypothetical experiments examined above,
the effect of a change in bank credit depends
heavily on whether or not deposits change.
One final hypothetical experiment will be
considered. Suppose the U.S. Treasury sells addi-
tional government securities to the public to
finance an increase in cash balances at commer-
cial banks. Since banks have received no addi-
tional reserves, total deposits cannot change.
Deposits owned by the public are transferred to
the Treasury. Bank credit is unchanged, but the
impact on the private sector is clearly contraction-
ary. The private sector holds more government
bonds and fewer deposits. Equilibrium can be
restored only through some combination of a
rise in interest rates and a decline in income.
The conclusion is that it appears to be funda-
mentally wrong for policymakers to place primary
reliance on bank credit. This is not to say that
there is no information to be gained from analysis
of bank and other credit flows. However, selection
of bank credit as the monetary aggregate would
be a mistake. Instead, information on credit flows
may be used to adjust the desired rate of growth of
the money stock, however it is defined, although
it is not clear that the knowledge presently exists
as to how to interpret credit flows.
From this analysis it appears that neither
bank credit nor any deposit total that includes
Treasury deposits is an appropriate monetary
aggregate for monetary policy purposes. Before
considering the narrow and broad definitions of
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base, total reserves, and unborrowed reserves.
It is clear that different levels of the money
stock may be supported by the same level of the
monetary base. Given the monetary base, different
levels of the money stock result from changes in
reserve requirement ratios; from shifts of deposits
between demand and time, which of course are
subject to different reserve requirement ratios;
from shifts of deposits among classes of banks
with different reserve ratios; and from shifts
between currency and deposits. These effects are
widely understood, and they have led to the con-
struction of monetary base figures adjusted for
changes in reserve requirements. Similar adjust-
ments are applied to total and nonborrowed
reserves. If enough adjustments are made, the
adjusted monetary base is simply some constant
fraction of the money stock, while adjusted
reserves are some constant fraction of deposits.
It is obviously much less confusing to adopt some
definition of the money stock as the appropriate
aggregate rather than to use the adjusted monetary
base or an adjusted reserve figure.
There can be no doubt that FOMC instructions
to the Manager in terms of nonborrowed reserves
would be more precise and more easily followed
than instructions in terms of the money stock.
But the simplicity of reserve instructions would
disappear if adjusted reserves were used, for then
the Manager would have to predict such factors
as shifts between demand and time deposits, the
same factors that must be predicted in controlling
the money stock. No one would argue that such
factors—and others such as changes in bank bor-
rowings and shifts in Treasury deposits—should
be ignored. lf the FOMC met daily, instructions
could go out in unadjusted form with the FOMC
making the adjustments. But surely this technical
matter should be handled not by the FOMC but
by the Manager and his staff in order to permit
the FOMC to concentrate on basic policy issues.
The only aggregates left to consider are the
narrowly and broadly defined money stocks.
There is a weak theoretical case favoring the
narrow definition because time deposits must be
transferred into demand deposits or currency
before they can be spent. The case is weak because
the cost of this transfer is relatively low. If the
cost were zero, then there would be no effective
distinction between demand and time deposits.
Indeed, since time deposits earn interest, all funds
would presumably be transferred to time deposits.
No strong empirical case exists favoring one
definition over the other. The broad and narrow
money stocks are so highly correlated over time
that it is impossible to distinguish separate effects.
It appears, however, that there is a practical case
favoring the adoption of the narrow money stock.
Time deposits include both passbook accounts,
which can be readily transferred into demand
deposits, and certificates of deposit, which can-
not. Since CD’s appear to be economically much
more like commercial paper than like passbook
time accounts, they ought to be excluded from
the broadly defined money stock.
There is, of course, no reason why CD’s cannot
be excluded from the definition of money. The
problem is that banks may in the future invent
new instruments that will be classified as time
deposits for regulatory purposes but that are not
really like passbook accounts. In retrospect it
may be clear how the new instrument should be
treated, but the situation may be confused for a
time. The same sort of problem exists with
demand deposits—consider the compensating
balance requirements imposed by many banks—
but it seems likely that the problem will remain
more serious for time deposits.
In summary, there is a strong case favoring
the selection of some definition of the money
stock as the monetary aggregate, and there appears
to be a marginal case for preferring the narrowly
defined money stock.
Technical Problems of Controlling
Money Stock
In the preceding sections it has been argued
that the monetary policy control instrument
should be the money stock. The purpose of this
section is to investigate some of the technical
problems in controlling the money stock. The
first topic examined is that of the form of instruc-
tions to the Manager of the System Open Market
Account. Following this discussion is an exami-
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there is an examination of the significance of
data revisions. All of this discussion is in terms
of the narrowly defined money stock, but much
of it also applies to other aggregates.
Specification of the Desired Money Stock.
There are two major issues connected with the
form of FOMC instructions to the Manager. The
first is whether the desired money stock should
be expressed in seasonally adjusted or unadjusted
form, while the second is whether the desired
money stock should be expressed in terms of a
complete path week by week over time or of an
average over some period of time. The first issue
turns out to be closely related to the question
of data revisions, and so its discussion will be
deferred for the moment. It is to the second issue
that we now turn.
Since required reserves are specified in terms
of a statement-week average, the statement week
is the natural basic time unit for which to measure
the money stock, and the measure takes the form
of the average of daily money stock figures over
the statement week. The fact that daily data may
not be available on all components of the money
stock does not affect the argument; however esti-
mated, the weekly-average figure is the most
appropriate starting point in the analysis.
The weekly money stock is clearly not subject
to precise control because of data lags and uncon-
trollable random fluctuations. Furthermore, no one
believes that these weekly fluctuations have any
significant impact. The natural conclusion to be
drawn is that there is no point in specifying
instructions in terms of weekly data but rather that
some average level over a period of weeks should
be used. Upon closer examination, however, this
conclusion can be shown to be unjustified.
The difficulty in expressing the instructions
in terms of averages can be explained very simply
by two examples. To keep the examples from
becoming too complicated, it will be assumed
that instructions take the form of simple rates of
growth on a base money stock of $200 billion.
The neglect of compounding makes no essential
difference to the argument.
For the first example, assume that the policy
instruction is for a growth rate of 4 percent per
annum, which is $8 billion per year or about
$154 million per week. If the money stock grew
by $154 million per week for 8 weeks, then the
figure for the eighth week would be above the
base week figure by an amount representing a 4
percent annual growth rate. The average of weeks
5 through 8 would be above the average of weeks
1 through 4 by $616 million, an amount also rep-
resenting a 4 percent annual growth rate. So far,
there is no reason to favor the path specification
over a specification in terms of 4-week averages.
Now suppose that the increase in weeks 1
through 4 was on schedule, but that a large uncon-
trollable increase of $500 million occurred in the
fifth week. Starting from a base-week figure of
$200 billion, the average money stock for weeks
1 through 4 would be $200.385 billion, and if the
instruction were in terms of 4-week averages it
would specify an average money stock of $201.001
billion for weeks 5 through 8.
Since by hypothesis the money stock grew
by $154 million in each of the first 4 weeks, in
the fourth week the level was $200.616 billion.
The jump of $500 million in the fifth week would
take the level to $201.116 billion, a figure already
above the desired average of $201.001 billion for
weeks 5 through 8. To reach this desired average
given the jump in week 5, the money stock in
weeks 6 through 8 would have to average less
than $201.001 billion, and so the money stock
would have to be forced below the level of the
fifth week for weeks 6 through 8. Furthermore,
as the reader may calculate, it would be necessary
to have higher than normal weekly growth in
weeks 9 through 12 if the average of these weeks
were to be above the average of weeks 5 through 8
by $616 million. On the other hand, if the instruc-
tion were in terms of the desired weekly path, the
instruction would read that the desired money
stock in the eighth week was $201.232 billion,
and therefore the Manager would not have to
force the money stock down in weeks 6 through
8. Instead, he could aim for a growth of about
$39 million in each of the weeks 6 through 8 to
bring the level in week 8 to the desired figure of
$201.232 billion.
From this example it can be seen that specifi-
cation in terms of averages of levels of the money
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fluctuations in a whipsawing fashion. Since
week-by-week fluctuations have essentially no
significance, there is no point in wrenching the
financial markets in order to undo a random
fluctuation. If averaging is to be used, the average
should be specified in terms of the desired average
weekly change over, say, the next 4 weeks rather
than in terms of the average level of the next 4
weeks. Specification in terms of the average
weekly change is equivalent to a specification
stating that the Manager should aim for a partic-
ular target level in the fourth week.
The second example illustrating the hazards
of specification in terms of the average level will
show what happens when policy changes. As
before, assume that the money stock in the base
week is $200 billion and that the desired growth
is at a 4 percent rate in weeks 1 through 4. In this
example it is assumed that there are no errors in
hitting the desired money stock. Thus, the money
stock is assumed to grow by $154 million per
week, reaching a level of $200.616 billion in the
fourth week and an average level of $200.385
billion for weeks 1 through 4.
Now suppose that in week 4 the FOMC
decides on a policy change and specifies a 1 per-
cent growth rate for the money stock for weeks 5
through 8. If the specification were in terms of the
average level, then it would require an increase
in the average level of $154 million, which would
bring the average level to $200.539 billion for
weeks 5 through 8. But the figure for week 4 is
already $200.616 billion, and so the money stock
in weeks 5 through 8 would have to average less
than the figure already achieved in week 4.
Thus, after a steady 4 percent growth week
by week, an average-level policy specification
would actually require a negative week-by-week
growth before the new 1 percent growth rate could
be achieved. On the other hand, a policy specifi-
cation in terms of the weekly path would require
a weekly growth of $38.5 million each week for
weeks 5 through 8.
To make the point clear, this example was
constructed so that the policy shift from a 4 to a
1 percent growth rate would actually require a
negative growth rate for a time on a week-by-week
basis when the instructions are in terms of average
levels. In general, when average levels are used,
a policy shift to a lower growth rate will require
in the short term a growth rate lower than the
new policy rate set, and a policy shift to a higher
growth rate will require a short-term growth rate
above the new policy rate. Since policymakers will
typically want to shift policy gradually, the levels
specification is especially damaging because it
in fact instructs the Manager to shift policy more
rapidly than the policymakers had desired. It
should be noted that the larger the number of
weeks included in the average-level specification,
the more severe this problem becomes.
Because the money stock cannot be controlled
exactly, there is a natural tendency to feel that
instructions stated in terms of averages are more
attainable. In actuality, of course, this effect is
illusory; averaging produces a smaller number to
measure the errors, but does not improve control.
Nevertheless, if averages are to be used in the
instructions, the above examples demonstrate
that the averages should be calculated in terms
of weekly (or perhaps monthly) changes but not
in terms of averages of levels.
Use of average changes does have one advan-
tage, however. An instruction in this form permits
the Manager to correct an error in week 1 over the
next few weeks rather than instructing him to
correct the error entirely in week 2. As explained
above, an instruction in terms of the average
weekly change over the next 4 weeks is equivalent
to an instruction in terms of the desired level in
week 4, leaving unspecified the desired levels in
weeks 1 through 3.
Control Through the Feedback Principle. It
is useful to begin by comparing the problems of
controlling the money stock with the problems
of controlling interest rates. In controlling interest
rates, the availability of continuous readings on
rates makes it possible for the Manager to exer-
cise very accurate control without understanding
the causes of rate changes. Being in continuous
contact with the market, the Manager can inter-
vene with open market purchases or sales as
soon as the federal funds rate, the Treasury bill
rate, or any other rate starts to change in an unde-
sirable fashion. This feedback control is not exact
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lag, and there are other lags such as the time
required to decide upon and execute an open
market transaction and the time it takes for the
market to react to the transaction.
More precise control over interest rates
could be achieved if the Manager were willing to
announce Federal Reserve buying and selling
prices for, say, 3-month Treasury bills available
to all comers. This is essentially the way in which
government securities were pegged during World
War II. In principle, there is no reason why such a
peg could not be operated in peacetime, although
it would certainly be desirable to change the peg
frequently, perhaps as often as every day or even
every hour. However, in terms of actual behavior
of interest rates there is no significant difference
between a frequently adjusted peg and continuous
intervention by the Manager as described in the
previous paragraph.
The main point of this discussion of interest
rate control is to emphasize that with frequent
interest rate readings it is not necessary to know
exactly what causes interest rate changes. In time
the Manager develops a feel for the market that
enables him to guess accurately which interest
rate changes are temporary and which are likely
to be “permanent” and so require offsetting open
market operations. Furthermore, his feel for the
market will enable him to know how large the
operations should be. Finally, when he guesses
wrongly on these matters, his continuous contact
with the market enables him to correct mistakes
rapidly.
The same arguments apply to controlling the
money stock. The difference between interest rate
control and money stock control is a matter of
degree rather than kind. Data on the money stock
become available with a greater lag, and the data
are more subject to revision. But since it is not
necessary to control the money stock down to
the last dollar, the question is whether it is tech-
nically possible to have control that is accurate
enough for policy purposes. The answer to this
question would certainly appear to be in the
affirmative.
The weekly-average figure for the money stock
is released to the public 8 days following the end
of the week to which the average refers. Of course,
data are available internally with a shorter lag.
Since the policy rule in the previous section is
based on controlling the monthly-average money
stocks it would appear that the data are at the
present time available with a short enough lag
that feedback methods of control are feasible.
To see how feedback control would work,
suppose that the Manager were instructed to come
as close as possible to a target money stock of M4 *
in week 4 of a 4-week operating horizon. The
Manager knows that the weekly change in the
money stock depends on open market purchases,
P, which he controls, and many other factors as
well, which for simplicity of exposition will be
denoted by one factor, z. These factors cannot be
predicted exactly, and so the Manager will think
of z as consisting of a predictable part, z ˆ, and an
unpredictable part, u. These relationships may
be expressed as
(5)
where ʱ is the coefficient giving the change in
money per dollar of open market purchases.
If there were no errors in measuring the money
stock, the analysis could be completed on the
basis of equation 5. But of course there are errors
in measuring the money stock. To analyze the
significance of measurement errors, let Mi be the
money stock for week i as measured at the end of
week i.18 Also, let Mi
f be the final “true” money
stock figure for week i, and let ei = Mi
f – Mi.
The Manager starts out the 4-week period
with an estimated money stock of M0 for week
zero. Of course, the figure for M0 is a preliminary
one, but revisions in this figure as more data accu-
mulate will affect the estimates for the money
stock in later weeks and so affect the Manager’s
actions in later weeks. It will be assumed that
he wants to increase the money stock by equal
amounts in each week to reach the desired figure of
∆MP zP z u =+ =+ + ʱʱ ˆ
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18 If a money stock estimate is not directly available at the end of
week i, one can be constructed by taking the estimate from actual
deposit data for week i – 1 and adding to it a projection for the
effects of open market operations and other factors for week i. This
projection would, of course, come from equation 5.M4 *inweek4.Inweek1,therefore,hewantstopro-
duce a change in the money stock 1/4(M4* – M0).
Substituting this figure into equation 5 we obtain
Thus, the Manager sets P1 according to
(6)
At the end of the first week the Manager has
the estimate, M1, for the money stock for that week,
and again it is assumed that he wants to spread
the desired change M* – M1 equally over the next
3 weeks. Thus, the Manager sets P2 according to
(7)




From equations 9 and 5 it can be seen that
the actual money stock in week 4 is
(10)
This expression for the fourth week of a planning
period generalizes to the nth week of a planning
period of any length merely by replacing the
subscript 4 by the subscript n. We can, therefore,
express the annual rate of growth, g, over an n
week period by
(11)
From equation 11 it can be seen that the actual
growth rate, g, equals the desired growth rate plus
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This analysis shows that a feedback control
system that continuously adjusts open market
operations as data on the money stock in the
recent past become available can achieve a target
rate of growth with a margin of error that is smaller
the longer the period over which the rate of growth
is calculated. It also provides a framework in
which to examine the relative importance of
operating errors, the ui, and data errors, the ei.
To obtain an accurate estimate of the sizes of
these errors is beyond the scope of this study.
However, a very crude method may be used to
obtain an estimate of the maximum size of the
total error. Monthly money stock changes at annual
rates were computed for the period January 1951
through September 1969 on the basis of seasonally
adjusted data. This time period yields a total of
225 monthly changes. Then each monthly change
was expressed in terms of its deviation from the
average of the changes for the previous 3 months.
For example, the September deviation was calcu-
lated by subtracting from the September monthly
change the average of the changes for August, July,
and June. The use of deviations allows in part
for longer-run trends in the money stock, which
trends are assumed to be readily controllable.
Since the deviations were calculated over a period
during which little or no attention was paid to
controlling the money stock, they surely represent
an upper limit to the degree of volatility in the
money stock to be expected under a policy
directed at control of the money stock.
These monthly deviations have a standard
deviation of 3.12 percent per annum. Applying
equation 11, except for replacing 52 by 1 to reflect
the fact that the rates of change were expressed
at annual rates in the first place, it is found that
the standard deviation over a 3-month period
would be 1.04 percent per annum. If it is assumed
that these deviations are normally distributed,
the conclusion is that over 3-month periods the
actual growth rate would be within plus or minus
1.04 percent of the desired growth rate about 68
percent of the time, and would be within plus or
minus 2.08 percent about 95 percent of the time.
Inasmuch as these limits would be cut in half
over 6-month periods, the actual growth rate 95
percent of the time would be in the range of plus
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When it is recalled that these calculations are
based on an estimate of variability over a period
in which very little attention was paid to stabi-
lizing money stock growth rates, it is clear that
fears as to the ability of the Federal Reserve to
control the money stock accurately are completely
unfounded.20
This conclusion justifies the approach used
at the beginning of this section on the selection
of a monetary aggregate, at least for the narrowly
defined money stock and most probably for other
aggregates as well. That approach, it will be
recalled, analyzed the selection issue on the
assumption that every one of the aggregates con-
sidered could be precisely controlled for all prac-
tical purposes. There can be no doubt that errors
in reaching targets for goal variables such as GNP,
at the present state of knowledge, are due almost
entirely to incomplete knowledge of the relation-
ships between instrument variables (such as vari-
ous aggregates and interest rates) and the goal
variables, and hardly at all to errors in setting
instrument variables at desired levels.
Problems of Data Revisions and Changing
Seasonality. Another topic that needs examina-
tion is the effect of data revisions. While weekly-
average data are released with an 8-day lag, these
figures are subject to revision. Not much weight
can be given to early availability of data that are
later revised substantially. To investigate this
problem, two money stock series were compared,
one “preliminary” and one “final.” Since the
analysis below is based on published monthly
data, it obviously provides little insight into the
accuracy of weekly data. However, since policy
instructions may be based on monthly data, the
analysis is of some value in assessing data accu-
racy. Furthermore, the conclusions on the impor-
tance of revisions in seasonal factors can be
expected to hold for the weekly data.
A “preliminary” series of monthly growth
rates of the money stock was constructed by cal-
culating the growth rate for each month from data
reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin for the
following month. For example, the Bulletin dated
September reports money stock data for 13 months
through August; it is the annual rate of change of
August over July that is called the “preliminary”
August rate-of-change observation. The “final”
series is the annual rate of growth calculated from
the monthly money stock series covering 1947
through September 1969, reported in the Federal
Reserve Bulletin for October 1969, pp. 790-93.
Data were gathered on both a seasonally adjusted
basis and an unadjusted basis for January 1961
through August 1969.
The correlation between the preliminary and
final seasonally adjusted series is 0.767, while
for the unadjusted series the correlation is 0.997.
Another way to compare the preliminary and
final series is to examine the differences in the
two series.21 For the seasonally adjusted data, the
differences have a mean of 0.122 and a standard
deviation of 3.704, and the mean absolute differ-
ence is 2.891. On the other hand, for the season-
ally unadjusted data the differences have a mean
of 0.150 and a standard deviation of 1.366, and
the mean absolute difference is 0.955.22
These results make it abundantly clear that
the major reason why the preliminary and final
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19 If the calculations are based on the variability of the monthly
changes themselves rather than on the deviations of the monthly
changes, the results are not greatly changed. The standard deviation
of the monthly changes over the same period used before is 3.53
per cent per annum, which yields a 95 percent chance of the growth
rate being in a range around the desired rate of plus or minus 2.36
(1.18) per cent per annum for 3-month (6-month) periods.
20 Compare “First, however, it may be worthwhile to touch on the
extensively debated subject whether the Federal Reserve, if it
wanted to, could control the rate of money supply growth. In my
view, this lies well within the power of the Federal Reserve to
accomplish provided one does not require hair-splitting precision
and is thinking in terms of a time span long enough to avoid the
erratic, and largely meaningless, movements of money supply
over short periods” (Holmes, 1969, p. 75).
21 The analysis of the differences inadvertently runs from February
1961 through August 1969 while the correlation analysis runs
from January 1961 through August 1969.
22 To take account of the fact that the “final” money stock series may
be further revised for months near the October 1969 publication
date of this series, the analysis of differences between the prelimi-
nary and final series was also run on the period February 1961
through December 1968. The mean difference, the standard devi-
ation of the differences, and the mean absolute difference, are,
respectively, for the seasonally adjusted data 0.026, 3.779, and
2.922, while the figures for the seasonally unadjusted data are
0.038, 1.280, and 0.890. In spite of the fact that the “final” series
is not really final for 1969 data, the average differences are gener-
ally larger for the longer period due to the relatively large data
revisions in the middle of 1969.figures on the money stock differ is revision of
seasonal adjustment factors. While such revisions
may produce substantial differences between
preliminary and final monthly growth rates, the
differences must be lower for the average of several
months’ growth rates. The reason, of course, is
that revision of seasonal factors must make the
figures for some months higher and those for other
months lower, leaving the annual average about
unchanged.
The significance of revisions in seasonal fac-
tors can be understood only after a discussion of
the significance of seasonality for a money stock
rule. If the monetary rule were framed in terms
of the seasonally unadjusted money stock, the
result would be to introduce substantially more
seasonality into short-term interest rates than now
exists. It can be argued not only that greater sea-
sonality in interest rates would not be harmful
but also that it would be positively beneficial.
Greater seasonality in interest rates would pre-
sumably tend to push production from busy, high-
interest seasons into slack, low-interest seasons.
Although the argument for seasonality in
interest rates could be pushed further, there is an
important practical reason for not initially adopt-
ing a money rule stated in terms of the seasonally
unadjusted money stock. The reason is that the
rule ties the growth rate of the money stock to the
seasonally adjusted unemployment rate and to
the interest rate. The rule has been developed
through an examination of past experience. If the
seasonal were taken out of the money stock, a
different seasonal would be put into interest rates,
and possibly into the unemployment rate as well.
Seasonal factors for these variables, especially for
the unemployment rate, determined from past data
would no longer be correct if the money stock
seasonal were removed. Seasonally adjusting the
unemployment index by the old factors could
produce considerable uncertainty over the appli-
cation of the monetary rule. Thus, application of
the rule through the seasonally unadjusted money
stock, if desirable at all, should only come about
through gradual reduction rather than immediate
elimination of seasonality. A further reason for a
gradual approach would be to permit the finan-
cial markets to adjust more easily to changed
seasonality.
The point of this discussion is not to urge
acceptance of a rule framed in terms of the unad-
justed money stock, since this step would not be
initially desirable in any case. Rather, the point
is to emphasize that seasonality is in the money
stock only in order to reduce the seasonality of
other variables, primarily interest rates. The sea-
sonality of the money stock, unlike variables such
as agricultural production, is not inherent in the
workings of the economy but rather exists because
the Federal Reserve wants it to exist. The money
stock can be made to assume any seasonal pattern
the Federal Reserve wants it to assume.
The monetary rule should be framed, at least
initially, in terms of the seasonally adjusted
money stock—using the latest estimated seasonal
factors. In subsequent years changes in these
seasonal factors should not result from mechani-
cal application of seasonal adjustment techniques
to the money stock data but rather should be the
result of a deliberate policy choice. The policy
choice would be based on the desire to change
seasonality of other variables. For example, if it
were thought desirable to take the seasonality out
of short-term interest rates, the seasonal factors
for the money stock would then be changed to
take account of changes in tax dates and other
factors.
Under a money stock policy, whether or not
guided by a monetary rule, revised seasonal factors
cannot properly be applied to past data. If the
changes are applied to past data with the result
that some monthly growth rates of adjusted data
become relatively high while others become rela-
tively low, the conclusion to be drawn is not that
policy was mistaken as a result of using faulty
seasonal factors. Instead, the conclusion is merely
that seasonal policy differed in the past from cur-
rent policy or from the seasonal pattern assumed
by the investigator who computed the seasonal
factors. Seasonal policy can be shown to be
“wrong” only by showing that undesirable sea-
sonals exist in other variables.
One final problem deserves discussion. While
it appears from the analysis of seasonally unad-
justed money stock data that revisions of the data
Poole
488 JULY/AUGUST 2008 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEWare relatively unimportant, at least from the evi-
dence for 1961-69, how should the policy rule be
adjusted when there are major data revisions—
as in the middle of 1969? For example, suppose
that revisions indicate that monetary growth has
been much higher than had been expected, and
higher than was desirable. On the one hand, policy
could ignore the past high rate of growth and
simply maintain the current rate of growth of the
revised series in the desired range. On the other
hand, the policy could be to return the money
stock to the level implied by applying the desired
growth rate to the money stock in some past base
period. The first alternative involves ratifying an
undesirable high past rate of growth, while the
second may involve a wrenching change in the
money stock to return it to the desired growth
path. The proper policy would no doubt have to
be decided on a case-by-case basis. However, a
useful presumption might be to adopt the second
alternative, but to set as the base the money stock
6 months in the past and to return to the desired
growth path over a period of several months.
Improving Control Over the Money Stock.
The analysis above has shown that under present
conditions the money stock can be controlled
quite accurately. However, it should be empha-
sized that there are numerous possibilities for
improving control. Although detailed treatment
of this subject is beyond the scope of this study,
a few very brief comments appear appropriate.
There are three basic methods for improving
control. The first method is that of improving the
data. The more quickly the deposit data are avail-
able, the more quickly undesirable movements
in the money stock can be recognized and cor-
rected. And the more accurate the deposit data,
the fewer the mistakes caused by acting on erro-
neous information. It is clear that expenditures of
money on expanding the number and coverage
of deposit surveys and on more rapid processing
of the raw survey data can improve deposit data.
The second method of improving control is
through research, which increases our under-
standing of the forces making for changes in the
money stock. For example, transfers between
demand and time deposits might be more accu-
rately predicted through research into the causes
of such transfers.
The third method of improving control is
through institutional changes. To reduce fluctua-
tions in excess reserves and thereby achieve a
more dependable relationship between total
reserves and deposits, the federal funds market
might be improved by making possible transfers
between the East and West Coasts after east coast
banks are closed. Also helpful would be a change
from lagged to contemporaneous reserve require-
ments. More radical reforms such as equalization
of reserve requirements for city, country, and
nonmember banks and elimination of reserve
requirements on time deposits should also be
considered.
V. SUMMARY
Purposes of the Study
The primary purpose of this study has been
to argue that a major improvement in monetary
policy would result through a systematic policy
approach based on adjustments in the money
stock. Equal emphasis has been placed on the
“systematic” part and the “money stock” part of
this approach. The analysis has proceeded first
by showing why policy adjustments should be
made through money stock adjustments, and
second by showing how these policy adjustments
might be systematically linked to the current
business situation through a policy guideline or
rule-of-thumb. A third, and subsidiary, part of
this study is an analysis of the reasons for prefer-
ring the money stock over other monetary aggre-
gates, and of some of the problems in reaching
desired levels of the money stock.
It has been emphasized throughout that this
policy approach is one that is justified for the
intermediate-term future on the basis of knowledge
now available. The specific recommendations
are not intended to be good for all time. Indeed,
the approach has been designed to encourage
evaluation of the results so that the information
obtained thereby can be incorporated into policy
decisions in the future.
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Uncertainty
Since policymakers have repeatedly empha-
sized the importance of uncertainty, it is necessary
to analyze policy problems within a model that
explicitly takes uncertainty into account. In par-
ticular, only within such a model is it possible to
examine the important current issue of whether
policy adjustments should proceed through
interest rate or money stock changes.
A monetary policy operating through interest
rate changes sets interest rates either through
explicit pegging as was used in World War II or
through open market operations directed toward
the maintenance of rates in some desired range.
Under such a policy the money stock is permitted
to fluctuate to whatever extent is necessary to keep
interest rates at the desired levels. On the other
hand, a policy operating through money stock
changes uses open market operations to set the
money stock at its desired level while permitting
interest rates to fluctuate freely.
If there were perfect knowledge of the relation-
ships between the money stock and interest rates,
the issue of money stock versus interest rates
would be nonexistent. With perfect knowledge,
changes in interest rates would be perfectly pre-
dictable on the basis of policy-induced changes
in the money stock, and vice versa. It would, there-
fore, be a matter of preference or prejudice, but
not of substance, whether policy operated through
interest rates or the money stock.
To analyze the interest versus money issue,
then, it is necessary to assume that there is a sto-
chastic link between the two variables. And, of
course, this is in fact the case. There are two fun-
damental reasons for the stochastic link. First, the
demand for money depends not only on interest
rates and the level of income but also on other
factors, which are not well understood. As a result,
the demand for money fluctuates in a random
fashion even if income and interest are unchanged.
If the stock of money is fixed by policy, these
random demand fluctuations will force changes
in interest and/or income in order to equate the
amount demanded with the fixed supply.
The second source of disturbances between
money and interest stems from disturbances in
the relationship between expenditures—especially
investment-type expenditures—and interest rates.
Given an interest rate fixed by policy, these dis-
turbances produce changes in income through
the multiplier process, and these income changes
in turn change the quantity of money demanded.
With interest fixed by policy, the stock of money
must change when the demand for money changes.
On the other hand, if the money stock were fixed
by policy, since the expenditure disturbance
changes the relationship between income and
interest, some change in the levels of income
and/or interest would be necessary for the quan-
tity of money demanded to equal the fixed stock.
Money stock and interest rate policies are
clearly not equivalent in their effects, given that
disturbances in money demand and in expendi-
tures do occur. Since the effects of these policies
are different, which policy to prefer depends on
how the effects differ and on policy goals. At this
level of abstraction, it is clearly appropriate to
concentrate on the goals of full employment and
price stability. Unfortunately, the formal model
that has been worked out, which is examined care-
fully in Section I above, applies only to the goal
of stabilizing income. If “income” is interpreted
to mean “money income,” then the goals of
employment and price level stability are included
but are combined in a crude fashion.
The basic differences in the effects of money
stock and interest rate policies can be seen quite
easily by examining extreme cases. Suppose first
that there are no expenditure disturbances, so
there is a perfectly predictable relationship
between the interest rate and the level of income.
In that case, a policy that sets the interest rate
sets income, and policymakers can choose the
level of the interest rate to obtain the level of
income desired. When the interest rate is set by
policy, disturbances in the demand for money
change the stock of money but not the level of
income. On the other hand, if policy sets the
money stock, then the money demand distur-
bances would affect interest and income leading
to less satisfactory stabilization of income than
would occur under an interest rate policy.
The other extreme case is that in which there
are disturbances in expenditures but not in money
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ture disturbances will produce fluctuations in
income. But if the money stock is fixed, these
income fluctuations will be smaller. This point
can be seen by considering a specific example such
as a reduction in investment demand. This dis-
turbancereducesincome.Butgivenanunchanged
money demand function, with the fall in income,
interest rates must fall so that the amount of
money demanded will equal the fixed stock of
money. The decline in the interest rate will stim-
ulate investment expenditures, thus offsetting in
part the impact on income of the initial decline
in the investment demand function. With expen-
ditures disturbances, then, to stabilize income, it
is clearly better to follow a money stock policy
than an interest rate policy.
The conclusion is that the money versus
interest issue depends crucially on the relative
importance of money demand and expenditures
disturbances. It is especially important to note
that nothing has been said about the size of the
interest elasticity of the demand for money, or
of the interest elasticity of investment demand.
These coefficients, and others, determine the rel-
ative impacts of changes in money demand and
in investment and government expenditures when
the changes occur. The interest versus money
issue does not depend on these matters, however,
but only on the relative size and frequency of
disturbances in the money demand and expendi-
tures functions.23
The analysis above is modified in detail by
considering possible interconnections between
money demand and expenditures disturbances.
It is also true that in general the optimal policy
is not a pure interest or pure money stock policy,
but a combination of the two. These matters, and
a number of others, are discussed in Section I.
Evidence on Relative Magnitudes of
Real and Monetary Disturbances
Resolution of the money versus interest issue
depends on the relative size of real and monetary
disturbances. Unfortunately, there is no com-
pletely satisfactory body of evidence on this
matter. Indeed, because of the conceptual diffi-
culties of designing empirical studies to investi-
gate the issue, the evidence is unlikely to be fully
satisfactory for some time to come. Nevertheless,
by examining a number of different types of evi-
dence, a substantial case can be built favoring
the use of the money stock as the policy control
variable.
Before discussing the evidence, it is necessary
to define in more detail what is meant by “distur-
bance.” Consider first a money demand distur-
bance. The demand for money depends on the
levels of income and of interest rates, and on other
variables. The simplest form of such a function
uses GNP as the income variable, and one interest
rate—say the Aaa corporate bond rate—and all
other factors affecting the demand for money are
treated as disturbances. To the extent possible,
of course, these other factors should be allowed
for, but for policy purposes these factors must be
either continuously observable or predictable in
advance so that policy may be adjusted to offset
any undesirable effects on income of these other
factors. Factors not predictable in advance must
be treated as random disturbances.
Similarly, expenditures disturbances are
defined as the deviations from a function linking
income to the interest rate and other factors. These
other factors would include items such as tax rates,
government expenditures, strikes, and population
changes. Again, for policy purposes these factors
must be forecast, and so errors in the forecasts of
these items must be included in the disturbance
term. It is important to realize that the disturbances
will be defined differently for scientific purposes
ex post because the true values of government
spending and so forth can be used in the functions
once data on these items are available.
In the discussion of the theoretical issues
above it was noted that an expenditure disturbance
would have a larger impact on income under an
interest rate policy than under a money stock
policy. Simulation of the FR-MIT model provides
the estimate that the impact on income of an
expenditures disturbance, say in government
spending, is over twice as large under an interest
rate policy as under a money stock policy. An
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23 For a full understanding of this important point, the reader should
refer to the analysis of Section I.error in forecasting government spending, then,
would lead to twice as large an error in income
under an interest rate policy. Since there is no
systematic record of forecasting errors for vari-
ables such as government spending and strikes,
there is no way of producing evidence on the size
of such forecasting errors. However, after listing
the variables that must be forecast, as is done in
Section II, it is difficult to avoid feeling that errors
in forecasting are likely to be quite significant.
These real disturbances, including forecast
errors in government expenditures, strikes, and
so forth, must be compared with the disturbances
in money demand. The reduced-form studies
conducted by a number of investigators provide
some evidence on this issue. These studies com-
pare the relative predictive power of monetarist
and Keynesian approaches in explaining fluctu-
ations in income. From these studies the predic-
tive power of both approaches appears about
equal. However, the predictive power of the
Keynesian approach relies on ex post observation
of “autonomous” expenditures, and it is clear
that these expenditures are subject to forecasting
errors ex ante whereas the money stock can be
controlled by policy.
The evidence from the reduced-form studies
suggests that when forecast errors of autonomous
expenditures are included in the disturbance
term, the disturbances are larger on the real side
than on the monetary side. There are many diffi-
culties with the reduced-form approach and so
these results must be interpreted cautiously.
Nevertheless, the results cannot be ignored.
The final piece of evidence offered in Section II
is a study by the author of the stability of the
demand for money function over time. Using a
very simple function relating the income velocity
of money to the Aaa corporate bond rate, he found
that a function fitted to quarterly data for 1947-60
also fits data for 1961-68 rather well. The reader
interested in the precise meaning of “rather well”
should turn to the technical discussion in
Section II.
Evidence on relative stability is difficult to
obtain and subject to varying interpretations. No
single piece of evidence is decisive, but all the
various scraps point in the same direction. The
evidence is not such that a reasonable man can
say that he has no doubts whatsoever. But since
policy decisions cannot be avoided, the reason-
able decision based on the available evidence is
to adopt the money stock as the monetary policy
control variable.
A Monetary Rule for Guiding Policy
The conclusion from the theoretical and
empirical analysis is that the money stock ought
to be the policy control variable. For this conclu-
sion to be very useful, it must be shown in detail
how the money stock ought to be used. It is not
enough simply to urge policymakers to make the
“appropriate” adjustments in the money stock in
the light of all “relevant” information.
There is no general agreement on exactly what
types of adjustments are appropriate. However, it
would probably be possible to obtain agreement
among most economists that ordinarily the money
stock should not grow faster than its long-run aver-
age rate during a period of inflation and should
not grow slower than its long-run average rate
during recession. But many economists would
want to qualify even this weak statement by saying
that there may at times be special circumstances
requiring departures from the implied guideline.
Others would say that there is no hope at present
of gauging correctly the impact of special circum-
stances (or even of “standard” circumstances) so
that policy should maintain an absolutely steady
rate of growth of the money stock.
The basic issues are, first, whether policy-
makers can forecast disturbances well enough to
adjust policy to offset them, and second, the
extent to which money stock adjustments to off-
set short-run disturbances will cause undesirable
longer-run changes in income and other variables.
The theoretical possibilities are many, but the
empirical knowledge does not exist to determine
which theoretical cases are important in practice.
It is for this reason that a systematic policy
approach is needed so that policy can be easily
evaluated and improved with experience.
Policy could be linked in a systematic way to
a large-scale model of the economy. Target values
of GNP and other goal variables could be selected
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the values of the money stock and other control
variables (for example, discount rate) needed to
achieve policy goals. While this approach may
be feasible in the future, it is not feasible now
because a sufficiently accurate model does not
exist. Instead, policy decisions are now made
largely on the basis of intuitive reactions to cur-
rent business developments.
Given this situation, the obvious approach is
to specify precisely how policy decisions ought
to depend on current developments, and this is
the approach taken in Section III. The specifica-
tion there takes the form of a policy guideline, or
rule-of-thumb. The proposed rule is purposely
simple so that evaluation of its merits would be
relatively easy. Routine evaluation of an operat-
ing guideline would over time produce a body of
evidence that could be used to modify and com-
plicate the rule. But it is necessary to begin with
a simple rule because the knowledge that would
be necessary to construct a sophisticated rule
does not exist.
The proposed rule assumes that full employ-
ment exists when the unemployment rate is in the
4.0 to 4.4 percent range. The rule also assumes that
at full employment, a growth rate of the money
stock of 3 to 5 percent per annum is consistent
with price stability. Therefore, when unemploy-
ment is in the full employment range, the rule calls
for monetary growth at the 3 to 5 percent rate.
The rule calls for higher monetary growth
when unemployment is higher, and lower mone-
tary growth when unemployment is lower.
Furthermore, when unemployment is relatively
high the rule calls for a policy of pushing the
Treasury bill rate down provided monetary growth
is maintained in the specified range; similarly,
when unemployment is relatively low the rule
calls for a policy of pushing the bill rate up pro-
vided monetary growth is in the specified range.
Finally, the rule provides for adjusting the rate of
growth of money according to movements in the
Treasury bill rate in the recent past. The exact rule
proposed is in Table 3 and the detailed rationale
for the various components of the rule is explained
in the discussion accompanying that table.
The rule is specified throughout in terms of
2 percent ranges for the rate of growth of the
money stock on a month-by-month basis. By
expressing the rule in terms of a range, leeway is
provided for smoothing undesirable interest rate
fluctuations and for minor policy adjustments in
response to other information. Furthermore, it is
not proposed that this rule-of-thumb or guideline
be followed if there is good reason for a departure.
But departures should be justified by evidence
and not be based on vague intuitive feelings of
what is needed since the rule was carefully
designed from the theoretical and empirical
analysis of Sections I and II, and from a careful
review of post-accord policy.
There is no way of really testing the proposed
rule short of actually using it. However, it is use-
ful to compare the rule with post-accord policy.
A detailed comparison may be found in Section III.
A summary comparison suggests, however, that
for the period January 1952 through July 1968
the rule would have provided a less appropriate
policy than the actual policy in only 63 of the
199 months in the period. The rule was judged
to be less appropriate if it called for a higher—
lower—rate of monetary growth than actually
occurred and unemployment 12 months hence
was below—above—the desired range of 4.0 to
4.4 percent. The rule was also judged less appro-
priate than the actual policy if actual policy was
not within the rule but unemployment neverthe-
less was in the desired range 12 months hence.
The rule actually has slightly fewer errors if the
criterion is unemployment either 6 or 9 months
following the months in question.
The rule has the great virtue of turning policy
around promptly as imbalances develop and of
avoiding cases such as the 2.2 percent rate of
decline in the money stock from July 1957 through
January 1958, during which time the unemploy-
ment rate rose from 4.2 percent to 5.8 percent.
Furthermore, it seems most unlikely that the rule
would produce greater instability than the policy
actually followed. Actual policy has, as measured
by the money stock, been most expansionary
during the early and middle stages of business
cycle expansions and most contractionary during
the last stages of business expansions and early
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the stability of various functions. If the demand
and supply functions for all of the various credit
instruments, including those of financial inter-
mediaries, were stable and were known, then it
would be possible to focus on any aggregate that
was convenient. For if all the functions were
known, then there would be known relationships
among various credit instruments, the money
stock, and stocks and flows of goods. But the
demand and supply functions for the various
credit instruments are not known, and it is
unlikely that they ever will be known with any
degree of precision. There are two basic reasons
for this state of affairs. The first, and less impor-
tant, is that given the great degree of substitutabil-
ity among credit instruments, substitutions are
constantly taking place as a result of changes in
regulations, including tax regulations. But second
and more important, individual credit instruments
are greatly influenced by changes in tastes and
technology, factors that economists do not under-
stand well.
As an example of the effects of regulations,
consider the substitution in recent years of deben-
tures for preferred stock as a result of the tax laws
permitting deduction of interest. As examples of
the effects of changes in tastes and technology,
consider the inventions of new instruments such
as CD’s and the shares in dual-purpose investment
funds. Furthermore, the relationships among
credit instruments will change as attitudes toward
risk change due to numerous factors including
perhaps fading memories of the last recession or
depression.
Money viewed as the medium of exchange
seems to be substantially less subject to changes
in tastes and technology than do other financial
assets. Of course, money is not immune to these
problems, as shown by the uncertainty presently
existing over the impact of credit cards. But a
great deal of empirical work on money has been
completed and the major findings have been sub-
stantiated by a number of different investigators.
And the interpretation of the empirical findings
is usually clear because the empirical work has
been conducted within the framework of a well-
developed theory of money. There is, on the other
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stages of business contractions. Unless a very
improbable lag structure exists, the rule would
surely be more stabilizing than the actual histori-
cal pattern of monetary growth.
Selection and Control of a Monetary
Aggregate
The analysis in this study is almost entirely
in terms of the narrowly defined money stock.
The reasons for using the narrowly defined money
stock as opposed to other monetary aggregates
may be stated fairly simply.
Some economists favor the use of bank credit
as the monetary aggregate because they view
policy as operating through changes in the cost
and availability of credit. The major difficulty
with this view is that there is no unambiguous
way of defining the amount of credit in the econ-
omy. And even if a satisfactory definition could
be worked out, there is no current possibility of
obtaining timely data on the total amount of credit
or of controlling the total amount.
The definitional problem arises largely from
the activities of financial intermediaries. Suppose,
for example, that an individual sells some corpo-
rate debentures and invests the proceeds in a
fixed-income type of investment fund, which in
turn uses the funds to buy the very same deben-
tures sold by the individual. If both the debentures
and the investment fund shares are counted as
part of total credit, then in this example total credit
has risen without any additional funds being
made available to the corporation to finance new
facilities and so forth.
As another example, it is difficult to see that
it would make any substantial difference to aggre-
gate economic activity whether a corporation
financed inventories through sales of commercial
paper to the public or through borrowing from
banks that raised funds through sales of CD’s to
the public. Since there are numerous close sub-
stitutes for bank credit, the amount of bank credit
is most unlikely to be an appropriate figure to
emphasize. Furthermore, since bank credit is only
a small part of total credit there is essentially no
possibility of controlling total credit, however
defined, through adjustments in bank credit.hand, no satisfactory theory of bank credit to
guide empirical work and to permit interpretation
of the significance of empirical findings.
For these reasons, and others, bank credit
does not appear to be an appropriate monetary
aggregate for policy to control. However, because
bank credit and the money stock were so highly
correlated in the past, it must be admitted that it
probably would not have made much difference
which one was used. From recent experience,
however, it appears that changes in banks’ non-
deposit sources of funds are likely to become more,
rather than less, important, and so in the future the
correlation between money and bank credit is
likely to be lower than in the past. If this predic-
tion is correct, then the issue is a significant one.
As a monetary aggregate, to be used for policy
adjustments, the money stock has clear advan-
tages over the monetary base and various reserve
measures. These aggregates are almost always
examined in adjusted form, where the adjustments
allow for such factors as changes in the currency/
deposit ratio, in reserve requirements, and in
shifts between time and demand deposits. The
adjustments are made because the effects of these
various factors are understood and are thought
to be worth offsetting. The adjustments have the
effect of making the base an almost constant frac-
tion of the money stock, or making total reserves
an almost constant fraction of demand deposits.
It obviously makes more sense to look directly at
the money stock, especially since given the nature
of the adjustments it is no easier to control the
adjusted base or adjusted total reserves than to
control the money stock.
The final aggregate to be considered is the
broadly defined money stock—the narrow stock
plus time deposits. No strong case can be made
against the broad money stock. From existing
empirical work both definitions of money appear
to work equally well. The theoretical distinction
between demand deposits and passbook savings
deposits depends on the costs of transferring
between the two types of deposits, and these costs
appear to be quite low. However, CD’s do appear
to be theoretically different and probably should
be excluded from the definition of money. The
major reason for excluding all time deposits from
the definition is that in the future banks may
invent new instruments that will be classified as
time deposits for regulatory purposes but for
which the matter of definition as money may not
be at all clear.
The issue of controllability is a technical one
and need not be discussed carefully in this sum-
mary. However, two conclusions may be stated.
First, instructions from the FOMC to the Manager
of the Open Market Account should take the form
of a specified average weekly change in the money
stock over the period between FOMC meetings.
Such an instruction must be distinguished from
one in terms of the average level of the money
stock over the period between FOMC meetings.
The average-level specification has several tech-
nical difficulties and should be avoided.
The second conclusion is that it is possible
to control the rate of growth of the money stock
over a 3-month period in a range of 1 percent on
either side of a desired rate of growth. This conclu-
sion is based on an analysis of monthly changes
in the money stock over the 1951-68 period, a
period during which little or no attention was
paid to stabilizing monetary growth, and it takes
the historical record at face value. Assuming that
efforts to control the money stock would in fact
succeed in part rather than make money growth
less stable than in the past, the estimate of plus
or minus 1 percent is an upper limit to the errors
in controlling the growth rate of money over 6-
month periods.
Concluding Remarks
The orientation throughout this study has
been the redirection of monetary policy on the
basis of currently available theory and evidence.
The recommendations are not utopian; in the
author’s view they are supported by current
knowledge and are operationally feasible. The
approach has been in terms of what ought to be
done in the near future, rather than in terms of
what might be done eventually if enough infor-
mation accumulates.
No effort has been made to slide over gaps in
our knowledge; rather, the emphasis has been on
how policy should be formed given the huge gaps
in our knowledge. Indeed, it is precisely these
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favoring policy adjustments through the money
stock.
It is the contention of this study that policy
can be improved if there is explicit recognition
of the importance of uncertainty. As much atten-
tion should be given to the consequences of errors
in projections as to the projections themselves.
Policy may be improved more by “don’t know”
answers to questions than by projections believed
by no one.
This is the static view. If policy can be
improved now through greater attention to uncer-
tainty, in the long run it can be improved further
only through a reduction in uncertainty. This
longer view underlies the proposal for a policy
rule-of-thumb. Policy successes and failures ought
to be incorporated into a policy design in a form
that will repeat the successes and prevent the
recurrence of the failures. Policymaking will
always require judgment, but the judgment will
be applied to changing problems at a moving
frontier of knowledge. A systematic formulation
of policy will speed the accumulation of knowl-
edge so that the policy problems of today will
become the technical staff problems of tomorrow.
REFERENCES
Andersen, Leonall C. and Jordan, Jerry L. “Monetary
and Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their Relative
Importance in Economic Stabilization.” Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, November 1968,
pp. 11-24.
Ando, Albert and Modigliani, Franco. “The Relative
Stability of Monetary Velocity and the Investment
Multiplier.” American Economic Review,
September 1965a, 55, pp. 693-728.
Ando, Albert and Modigliani, Franco. “Rejoinder.”
American Economic Review, September 1965b, 55,
pp. 786-90.
Brainard, William. “Uncertainty and the Effectiveness
of Policy.” American Economic Review: Papers
and Proceedings of the 79th Annual Meeting of the
American Economic Association, May 1967, 57,
pp. 411-25.
Brunner, Karl and Meltzer, Allan H. “The Federal
Reserve’s Attachment to the Free Reserve Concept.”
Subcommittee on Domestic Finance, Banking, and
Currency Committee, House of Representatives,
88th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1964.
de Leeuw, Frank and Gramlich, Edward. “The Federal
Reserve–MIT Econometric Model.” Federal Reserve
Bulletin, January 1968, 54, pp. 11-40.
DePrano, Michael and Mayer, Thomas. “Tests of the
Relative Importance of Autonomous Expenditures
and Money.” American Economic Review,
September 1965a, 55, pp. 729-52.
DePrano, Michael and Mayer, Thomas. “Rejoinder.”
American Economic Review, September 1965b, 55,
pp. 791-92.
Fels, Rendigs and Hinshaw, C. Elton. Forecasting
and Recognizing Business Cycle Turning Points.
New York: National Bureau of Economic Research,
1968.
Friedman, Milton and Meiselman, David. The
Relative Stability of Monetary Velocity and the
Investment Multiplier in the United States, 1897-
1958. Commission on Money and Credit,
Stabilization Policies. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.
Friedman, Milton and Meiselman, David. “Reply to
Donald Hester.” Review of Economics and Statistics,
November 1964, 46, pp. 369-76.
Friedman, Milton and Meiselman, David. “Reply to
Ando and Modigliani and to DePrano and Mayer.”
American Economic Review, September 1965, 55,
pp. 753-85.
Hester, Donald D. “Keynes and the Quantity Theory:
A Comment on the Friedman-Meiselman CMC
Paper.” Review of Economics and Statistics,
November 1964a, 46, pp. 364-68.
Hester, Donald D. “Rejoinder.” Review of Economics
and Statistics, November 1964b, 46, pp. 376-77.
Holmes, Alan R. “Operational Constraints on the
Stabilization of Money Supply Growth,” Controlling
Poole
496 JULY/AUGUST 2008 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEWMonetary Aggregates. Boston: Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, 1969.
Holt, Charles C. “Linear Decision Rules for Economic
Stabilization and Growth.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, February 1962, 76, pp. 20-45.
Laidler, David E.W. The Demand for Money: Theories
and Evidence. Scranton, PA: International Textbook
Company, 1969.
Latané, Henry A. “Cash Balances and the Interest
Rate—A Pragmatic Approach.” Review of Economics
and Statistics, November 1954, 36, pp. 456-60.
Latané, Henry A. “Income Velocity and Interest
Rates—A Pragmatic Approach.” Review of
Economics and Statistics, November 1960, 42,
pp. 445-49.
Mincer, Jacob, ed. Economic Forecasting and
Expectations. New York: National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1969.
Moore, Geoffrey H. and Shiskin, Julius. “Indicators
of Business Expansions and Contractions.”
Occasional Paper 103, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1967.
Poole, William. “Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy
Instruments in a Simple Stochastic Macro Model.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1970, 84,
pp. 197-216.
Reynolds, Lloyd G. Economics. Third Edition.
Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969.
Samuelson, Paul A. Economics. Seventh Edition.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.
Theil, Henri. Optimal Decision Rules for Government
and Industry. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing
Company, 1964.
Zarnowitz, Victor. “An Appraisal of Short-Term
Economic Forecasting.” Occasional Paper 104,
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1967.
Poole
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JULY/AUGUST 2008 497498 JULY/AUGUST 2008 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW